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Abstract 
Presently, monitoring and evaluation is an aid practice that does not emphasise Ni-
Vanuatu ownership. Despite the current aid agenda’s advocacy for ownership, 
principles of measuring for results and accountability are given preference in this 
practice. Eighteen participants working in monitoring and evaluation in NGOs and 
government departments in Luganville and Port Vila were interviewed for this study 
in April and May, 2013. Through semi-structured interviews they shared their 
experiences of the practice. They highlighted issues around capacity, kastom and 
donors, emphasising monitoring and evaluation’s inability to account for the local 
context and promote ownership.  
It was found that the current approach to monitoring and evaluation follows a 
universal model, disregarding country specific features of Vanuatu such as kastom, 
language and land. However, these features embody the identity of Ni-Vanuatu and 
define Ni-Vanuatu ownership. They should therefore dictate how monitoring and 
evaluation is carried out. A move for stronger Ni-Vanuatu ownership of aid practices 
such as monitoring and evaluation will be complicated and messy. However, 
approaching monitoring and evaluation through a local lens while employing 
relationship building and flexibility can lead to increased Ni-Vanuatu ownership of 
the practice. 
Keywords: Vanuatu, Monitoring and Evaluation, Ownership, Neostructuralism, Aid 
Effectiveness, Aid Practices, Storian, Language, Kastom. 
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Introduction 
1.1 Preface 
My motivations for conducting this research emerged from my year volunteering at a 
youth centre in Luganville, Vanuatu in 2011. The centre was attached to a sexual 
health clinic and was a very busy place. There were young people using the centre’s 
resources, clients in the clinic, nurses, peer educators, tutors and a few volunteers 
frequenting the centre and clinic each day. I was well positioned to observe and 
encountered many examples of monitoring and reporting at the centre. However the 
experiences that stood out and made me most interested in this field were the 
evaluations and reviews. The clinic and centre had multiple funders and so it was 
common for overseas visitors to carry out evaluations, reviews or come in for 
meetings. Having studied development in university, I was looking forward to seeing 
how participatory development played out in practice. As it turned out the 
evaluations and reviews, while following the textbooks, were not quite as successful 
as I had anticipated.   
It was always evident when someone from overseas came to visit. People would look 
at each other and ask who the waetman1 was on the premises. I was used to this as I 
had been that waetman for a long time but by the time the reviewers and evaluators 
came the centre was pretty used to me and I was no longer newsworthy. One 
particular group of waetman stood out for me. They were Australian, living in Port 
Vila and spoke strained Bislama. First they delivered their message, the reason for 
their review, to the group they wished to speak to (comprising staff and tutors of 
different ages and sexes from teenage boys to mamas over forty). Following this, 
they broke us into groups so that they could talk to us in smaller numbers. Groups 
consisted of different ages and sexes. However when the evaluators started talking to 
the groups the males stared at the ground and the mamas were silent apart from their 
clicking fingers which continued to crochet, not wanting to fall behind on their 
handcraft classes.  
                                                
1 European 
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I was impressed that the reviewers were using as much Bislama as possible but with 
their thick Australian accents and the heavy reliance of English words within their 
Bislama they were not understood very well. They often reverted to English when 
they saw that no one understood them. However I’m not even sure that it was their 
poor command of Bislama that meant people were unwilling to talk to them. When 
no one volunteered responses one reviewer proceeded to go around the circle 
directing her questions to each person. There were a lot of “I don’t know” answers 
and most people continued to stare at the ground. The reviewer was obviously 
frustrated by this, not seeming to understand that avoiding eye contact is very 
common in parts of Vanuatu in certain situations.   
The reviewer went through her list of questions. One question asked how many 
youth from the previous year had returned to the centre that year. She then 
approached each person in the circle for a response. Seeing that she would have to 
answer, a mama turned to me and asked me in Bislama to explain the question. I said 
that the woman wanted to know how well we retain youth at the centre, how we 
make sure they want to come back again next year. The mama looked cross and 
explained to me that they weren’t like white people, they moved around and people 
often went back to their home islands. Within the context, she couldn’t understand 
why the question was being asked.  
I often contrast that experience of an overseas review with another which was carried 
out in quite a different manner. An Australian man came together with a Ni-Vanuatu 
woman who was known to everyone as she worked for our Non-Governmental 
Organisation (NGO) in Port Vila. He arrived at the centre soaked in sweat and 
immediately sat and fanned himself in front of everyone exclaiming to the staff in a 
friendly manner, “I’m so hot!”. This gesture succeeded in breaking the ice with the 
staff who laughed at this waetman fanning himself in his pressed shirt in the Vanuatu 
heat.  
This reviewer sat and hung out with the staff while the Ni-Vanuatu woman arranged 
interviews through our boss. He made time to talk to every staff member, either 
individually or in groups as they preferred. While he did not speak any Bislama he 
conducted all interviews with the Ni-Vanuatu woman. He joked with the staff in 
English, and his comical manner meant he was understood across the language 
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barrier. He stayed around to watch the hip-hop group after the interviews. They had 
wanted to show him some of their new moves and when they did not start on time he 
sat around under the trees happily waiting for them. He made people feel so 
comfortable that they actually wanted to have interviews and talk to him.  
There was a significant difference between the two reviews. The first seemed to 
follow the rules for appropriate engagement. The review team members used 
Bislama, they introduced themselves in front of the group before breaking into 
smaller groups and they approached every member of the group to make sure all 
opinions were heard. The second method appeared random and disorganised. The 
man seemed almost unprofessional in his fanning and complaining about the heat. 
He stayed beyond his work hours to see a hip-hop group and appeared to be making 
friends with the staff. This hardly seemed an objective approach. Yet it was more in 
line with Ni-Vanuatu, with the way people work and relate to each other. He 
acknowledged each person by offering to meet them independently or in groups and 
despite the heat still dressed formally to indicate his respect for the occasion. He 
allowed people to feel relaxed, making fun of himself and making himself a lot less 
intimidating and scary.  
It was these observations, together with the monitoring and reporting conducted at 
the centre, that started me thinking about monitoring and evaluation and how it is 
applied within the cultural context. It made me question the validity of a universal or 
‘one size fits all’ methodology. The approaches of the first review could have been 
successful in certain New Zealand contexts but were clearly not working in the 
context of the youth centre. At university I had learnt about the Paris Declaration and 
the push for ownership. However at the youth centre in Luganville I couldn’t see any 
real sense of ownership occurring at any stage during that first review. It was a 
donor-driven process that did not seem to reflect the everyday reality of what 
happened and what was achieved at the youth centre. The experience raised many 
questions for me in terms of development practice. Was there a “right” way to 
conduct monitoring and evaluation? What is more important: to follow the Western 
“objective” way of conducting aid practices, or to better represent the views and 
realities of local people? Why was a process being followed that clearly wasn’t 
working?  
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My personal view of development is based on the Māori proverb, “He aha te mea nui 
o te ao? He tangata! He tangata! He tangata!” “What is the most important thing? It 
is people! It is people! It is people!” People are central to development, ownership is 
central to development. So why then was monitoring and evaluation being carried 
out in a way that did not represent the people, that did not embody ownership? It 
seemed that people were working for the practice rather than the practice working 
for the people.   
This was my personal motivation for the research: to try and understand how Ni-
Vanuatu felt about this practice. I wasn’t as concerned with the technicalities of 
monitoring and evaluation but in what people thought of the processes involved. I 
wanted to see if they felt the same frustrations as I observed while working at the 
youth centre. Ownership and people need to be right at the centre for a process to be 
effective. So how could monitoring and evaluation better reflect the people it was 
supposed to serve? 
1.2 Research focus 
The current aid agenda prescribes a range of principles to improve overall aid 
effectiveness. Ownership is central to this agenda. The practice of monitoring and 
evaluation (M&E), a fundamental element in aid management, is also emphasised by 
the aid sector’s increased demand for accountability and push for results 
management. This research explores the notion of ownership within aid practice by 
examining monitoring and evaluation. It looks at the practice of monitoring and 
evaluation, as experienced by Ni-Vanuatu aid recipients, to see how ownership is 
being played out in reality.  
Paramount to the research is people. As a consequence, the study centres first and 
foremost around Ni-Vanuatu and their experience and feelings about monitoring and 
evaluation. It seeks to approach the practice from a Ni-Vanuatu outlook, moving 
away from the universal donor viewpoint. By taking a wide lens the research looks at 
their experience of the overall practice, rather than focusing on the intricacies of the 
processes involved. It is therefore hoped that some of the findings can be applied to 
other aid practices.  
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By examining the Ni-Vanuatu experience of monitoring and evaluation the research 
unravels the place of ownership within the practice. It uses the findings to suggest 
approaches for increasing ownership further. The research is divided into a two-part 
research aim and four sub-questions. 
1.2.1 Research aim 
The aim of this research is to analyse the place of ownership in monitoring and 
evaluation in Vanuatu in order to understand how it can increase.  
1.2.2 Sub-questions 
How do Ni-Vanuatu NGO and government employees experience monitoring and 
evaluation? 
What are some of the obstacles to monitoring and evaluation in Vanuatu? 
What is the role of donors with regard to monitoring and evaluation? 
How could monitoring and evaluation work better in the Ni-Vanuatu context? 
The study looks solely at NGO and government employees’ thoughts and issues with 
the practice and does not attempt to provide a balanced view that includes donors. 
While donors’ concerns are raised in the context of the literature and in participants’ 
comments, unique donor concerns were not sought out.  
Monitoring and evaluation and ownership are both key to aid effectiveness and 
consequently the research aims to contribute towards the literature on aid 
effectiveness. A Pacific Island was chosen for the research in order to contribute to 
this literature focussing on the Pacific (e.g. Murray and Overton (2011a); Ulu 
(2013); Wrighton and Overton (2012)). Researching in a small Pacific Island nation 
offers a unique take on the particular demands on ownership resulting from a 
nation’s size (Murray & Overton, 2011a). The research is based in Vanuatu as New 
Zealand is a primary bi-lateral donor to the country. Furthermore, as explained in the 
preface, it was here that I experienced first-hand limited local ownership of 
monitoring and evaluation.  
1.3 Setting and Context: Vanuatu 
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To understand the context of the research a general overview will be given to 
introduce Vanuatu, with special attention to areas important to the research. The 
study is based in the Republic of Vanuatu, an archipelago nation of 83 mostly 
mountainous islands in Melanesia. Vanuatu has a population of approximately 
234,000 (Vanuatu National Statistics Office, 2009a), 95.5% of whom are Ni-
Vanuatu (Vanuatu National Statistics Office, 2009b). Almost a quarter of the 
population live in the urban centres of Port Vila and Luganville (Secretariat of the 
Pacific Community, 2013), the two towns in which the research was based.  
Vanuatu’s history has shaped the identity of the country of today. Melanesians were 
the first inhabitants of Vanuatu. They are believed to have migrated from south-
eastern Asia three thousand years ago in dugout canoes with their families and 
domestic animals, including pigs which still hold great importance in Ni-Vanuatu 
culture today (Miles, 1998). Vanuatu has an interesting colonial history. France and 
Britain jointly ruled the country, then called the New Hebrides, as a condominium. 
Governance was organized on the basis of equality of government and co-existence 
(Weisbrot, 1989), meaning separate education systems, medical services, police, 
currencies and languages. However joint systems existed in areas such as public 
works, public health, financial administration and land surveying. To confuse the 
matter further, the law was divided into French civil law, British common law, joint 
or condominium law, and indigenous customary law (Weisbrot, 1989). The system 
was inefficient and Ni-Vanuatu “were neither consulted in its establishment nor 
involved in its operation” (Molisa, Vurobaravu, & Van Trease, 1982: 85; as cited in 
Weisbrot, 1989).  
Following the trend of decolonization across the globe and Pacific, the New 
Hebrides gained independence on the 31st of July 1980 under Prime Minister Walter 
Lini (known as Father Lini) and was renamed Vanuatu. While the British supported 
this move, the French were reluctant. Vanuatu came to independence  “with a sense 
of having had to fight for it, and of having defeated a more powerful adversary” 
(Campbell, 1989: 209).  When independence was claimed, the French were said to 
have sabotaged their own office equipment to hinder the new administration 
(Fischer, 2013). The challenge for the Ni-Vanuatu government was to make sense of 
the mess left by the colonial powers (Weisbrot, 1989). 
7 
 
Vanuatu today is a democratic country with provincial councils in its six provinces 
in addition to national government. It is classified by the United Nations and OECD 
as a Least Developed Country (LDC)2, and a Small Island Developing State (OECD, 
2012; UN-OHRLLS, 2012). Vanuatu receives aid3 from both bilateral and 
multilateral donors. In 2012 Australia was its largest bi-lateral donor (Government of 
the Republic of Vanuatu, 2013), prioritising its aid around economic development, 
education, governance, health and general development support (Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2013). New Zealand was the second largest bi-lateral 
donor (Government of the Republic of Vanuatu, 2013), prioritising private sector 
development, shipping and other infrastructure, education and governance 
(Government of New Zealand & Government of the Republic of Vanuatu, 2011). 
The United Nations and the European Union (EU) are the major multi-lateral donors 
(Government of the Republic of Vanuatu, 2013). 
Vanuatu national politics are plagued by instability, with regular motions of no 
confidence and reshuffling of political parties (Forsyth, 2009). This fragmentation 
also occurs at local level and the instability makes reform difficult with politicians 
hesitant to provide coherent policy (Forsyth, 2009). The instability and frequent 
changes of government also contribute to Vanuatu’s recognised problem with 
corruption (Jowitt, 2005; Transparency International, 2011).4  
Agriculture, forestry and fishing contribute approximately 15% of Vanuatu’s GDP 
(Government of the Republic of Vanuatu, 2011) and over half the population 
depends on subsistence agriculture for their livelihood (United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development, 2012). Construction and tourism are the current drivers 
of Vanuatu’s Gross Domestic Product. However its economy is exposed to natural 
disasters. Vanuatu ranks number one on the world risk index (Alliance Development 
Works, 2012). 5  A further constraint on the economy is the country’s geography:  “a 
widely scattered and mountainous island geography, with the population scattered 
                                                
2 Based on per capita gross national income, human assets and economic vulnerability to external shocks. 
3 $US23.5m in aid flows (grants) in 2012 (IMF, 2013). 
4 Vanuatu received a score of 3.5 on a scale where 0 is highly corrupt and 10 is clean in the Corruption 
Perceptions index 2011. 
5 Composing its exposure to natural hazards susceptibility, coping capacities, and adaptive capacities. 
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across 83 islands, in association with poor transport infrastructure” (International 
Labour Organization, 2009). 
The research focuses on both government and NGOs in Vanuatu. NGOs play a 
major role in providing services to the community. 6 There are a large number of 
NGOs working in Vanuatu, approximately 120.7 A Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) was signed between the Vanuatu Association of Non-Government 
Organisations (VANGO) and the Vanuatu government in 2004 putting VANGO in a 
greater partnership role with the government (World Bank, 2006). The MoU also 
highlights the need for the government to be accountable for public funds and NGOs 
to be accountable for funding provided through government programmes. Both 
parties are accountable for reporting to the public on joint initiatives (IFRC, 2011). 
Although the research was only based in the towns of Port Vila and Luganville, it 
concerns a practice (monitoring and evolution) that is carried out across the country. 
Vanuatu is a very diverse country. This is illustrated by its geographical spread over 
many islands, the multitude of languages spoken and the different cultures and 
kastom unique to particular villages and islands. The extent of its diversity is 
highlighted in the words of one of its former presidents: “We are like 100 nations 
inside one country” (Culliwick, 2007; as cited in Forsyth, 2009: 19). 
Culture is central to Ni-Vanuatu identity. Kastom is a concept that appears frequently 
in this research and in day-to-day conversation with Ni-Vanuatu. In this research, 
kastom is used to represent Vanuatu’s customs, cultures and traditions. Though some 
literature has given it a stricter definition, such as Miles (1998) who likens it to 
morality in the West and describes it as signifying “the proper, or indigenously 
authentic, way of living, acting, and behaving in society, the proper and indigenous 
way of living and doing things” (Miles, 1998: 81), others, such as Bolton (2003) 
found that many people did not distinguish between custom, culture and tradition 
and kastom was used as an umbrella term representing all three. The lack of 
clarification around its meaning can lead to different interpretations (Tonkinson, 
                                                
6 For example, see the mention of NGOs in the Government of Vanuatu (2006) Priorities and Action Agenda 
2006-2015.   
7 The Vanuatu Association of Non-Government Organisations (VANGO) has approximately 123 members 
(Vanuatu Daily Post, 2012)  and most Ni-Vanuatu NGOs are associated with VANGO (World Bank, 2006) . 
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1982). Therefore, the term will not be strictly defined. Keeping a broad definition of 
kastom aligns with the comment of former President of the Malvatumauri8, Chief 
Willie Bongmatur, who writes that only Melanesians can know for themselves the 
“meaning and significance of the terms culture, custom, and tradition and the 
importance of these concepts within national and village life” (Bongmatur, 1994: 
85).  
Ligo (1980: 58) points to language as a strong indicator of kastom being alive and 
practiced today, as kastom is heavily embedded in language: “Ol kastom blong 
Vanuatu ikat stamba blong olgeta hemi langwis”9. Vanuatu has 106 indigenous 
languages with varying numbers of speakers (Lynch & Crowley, 2001), and these 
languages are a symbol of identity within Vanuatu (Crowley, 2000).  Bislama, a 
creole language, is the national language of Vanuatu and English and French are 
official languages.  
There is furthermore a strong relationship between kastom and land. Land is central 
to Ni-Vanuatu identity (Leach, 2013; Regenvanu, 1980). Ni-Vanuatu’s relationship 
with land can be best described in the words of former Minister for Lands 
Regenvanu (1980: 66):  
Kraon olsem hemi wan pat blong laef blong ol man. Kraon long Ni-Vanuatu 
hemi sem mak olsem wan mama wetem pikinini blong hem. Wetem kraon nao 
hemi save talemaot hem mo wetem kraon hemi save holem taet ol kastom 
tambu paoa blong hem.10  
Not surprisingly, land comprised a key factor in Vanuatu’s strive for independence 
(Rousseau, 2011).  
When discussing Ni-Vanuatu culture, it is also important to note that Vanuatu is a 
very religious country. 83% of Ni-Vanuatu identify as Christian (Miles, 1998) and 
the church plays a major role both in the community and on a national level. Despite 
                                                
8 Vanuatu National Council of Chiefs 
9 This is translated in the text as, “It can be said that language is one of the bases of custom in Vanuatu.” 
10 This is translated in the text as, “Land is an intrinsic part of themselves and their whole being. Land to Ni-
Vanuatu is what a mother is to a baby. It is with land that he defines his identity and it is with land that he 
maintains his spiritual strength.” 
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the unique syncretism of “native and imported religion” (Miles, 1998: 117), of 
kastom and Christianity, most Christians see kastom as compatible with Christianity 
(Miles, 1998: 102).  
Naturally, kastom is constantly influencing and shaping new practices in Vanuatu. 
This is seen in the ongoing negotiation of the kastom system and the court system 
(Forsyth, 2009). Likewise kastom will play a role in defining ownership of 
monitoring and evaluation practices.  
The Ni-Vanuatu context serves not only as a backdrop but plays a central role in this 
research. The research aims to understand the place of ownership in monitoring and 
evaluation in Vanuatu and how ownership can increase through looking at the 
experiences of Ni-Vanuatu. The Ni-Vanuatu context, including kastom and 
language, is important as it is ever-present in the participants’ worldviews and how 
they experience monitoring and evaluation.  
The research will be unfolded over six chapters, including this introduction which 
concludes with a chapter overview providing a brief summary of the remainder of 
the thesis:  
1.4 Chapter Overview 
1.4.1 Chapter two: Literature Review 
An overview of the global literature around current aid paradigms, aid effectiveness, 
ownership and monitoring and evaluation is offered. These areas are explored with 
specific reference to ownership and the part ownership plays. The context is then 
grounded in the literature by the presentation of regional-specific writing on the 
Pacific and Vanuatu.  
1.4.2 Chapter three: Methodology 
This chapter explores my approach to the research. It introduces my epistemological 
stance, examines and critiques reflexivity and positionality, as well as the concept of 
multiple identities. The chapter then looks at the rationale for the research and 
ethical issues. Methodologies are discussed, including storian and the use of 
Bislama. Methods used in the research are presented and are broken into the steps 
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followed in conducting the research: the literature review, field research, analysis 
and presentation of findings. Finally, limitations of the methodology are put forward.  
1.4.3 Chapter four: Looking In: Reflecting Internally 
The research findings are broken into two chapters. The first chapter, “Looking In: 
Reflecting Internally”, explores the participants’ reflections on themselves with 
regard to the monitoring and evaluation practice. The participants put forward two 
groups of tensions or difficulties with monitoring and evaluation. The first group 
consists of generic concerns, common in the development literature, around 
capacity: systems and processes, staff, and communication and coordination. The 
second group of tensions presented are not barriers but represent the contextual 
features of Vanuatu which clash with monitoring and evaluation. These are kastom, 
language and land. They form a critique of monitoring and evaluation’s ability to 
meet the local context.  
1.4.4 Chapter five: Looking Out: Reflecting Externally 
The second chapter of findings presents the participants’ views ‘looking out’. This 
explores the participants’ views on external factors, namely donor behaviour and 
practices. Monitoring and evaluation is seen largely as an externally driven practice, 
and therefore many of the processes do not align with Ni-Vanuatu kastom. 
Participants offered critiques of the style and frequency of reporting. A significant 
amount of the conversation also focused on external evaluations and how Ni-
Vanuatu can gain greater ownership of this practice. The limited harmonisation and 
alignment of donors are also examined. The chapter includes suggestions from the 
participants for the improvement of donor systems and practices in order to increase 
ownership. These suggestions inform the themes discussed in the concluding 
chapter. 
1.4.5 Chapter six: Conclusion 
The final chapter presents an overview of the research and explores the key concerns 
of each of the findings chapters. Both of these show that the monitoring and 
evaluation practice, as it currently stands, is not tailored for Vanuatu and does not 
promote Ni-Vanuatu ownership. The findings lead to three key themes that are then 
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explored through an underlying local lens: flexibility, relationships and ownership. 
Through these themes, the chapter makes recommendations for increasing local 
ownership of monitoring and evaluation.  
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Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will explore monitoring and evaluation and ownership within the aid 
literature. These two concepts have roots in the neoliberal and neostructural 
paradigms. Failings of the neoliberal agenda together with the influence of 
neostructuralism and its emphasis on the state have led to a strong focus on 
ownership. At the same time, a need for aid efficiency and results management has 
seen a strong push for monitoring and evaluation. This has resulted in ownership 
being encouraged while at the same time Western systems of accountability and 
transparency, including monitoring and evaluation, being enforced. The literature 
explores this interplay and at the same time critiques the universal approach to aid 
whereby practices are not tailored by local contexts. This global literature provides a 
backdrop in which the geographical literature focusing on the Pacific, and moreover 
Vanuatu, is then situated.  
2.2 Neoliberalism and Neostructuralism 
Neoliberalism, an economic, political and cultural paradigm, dominated aid policy in 
the 1980s and early 1990s. It held that state intervention causes inefficiency and a 
deregulated market allows investment and trade, notably comparative advantage, that 
maximizes total global welfare (Murray, 2009). While poverty was not an immediate 
concern, it would be addressed by the trickle-down effect (Murray & Overton, 
2011a). In reality, the reduced size and capacity of the state meant that NGOs were 
left to deliver vital services (Murray & Overton, 2011b). 
Neoliberal policies spread throughout developing countries, mainly through 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). SAPs were imposed on developing 
countries by organisations such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) through conditionalities of aid (reform measures linked to aid). SAPs used 
neoliberal approaches to policy reform to integrate developing countries’ economies 
instantaneously into the global market, the same market for which industrialised 
countries had had decades to prepare their own economies (Murray, 2009).  By 1990 
all Latin American and almost all African countries had adopted neoliberal policies 
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and most had also adopted SAPs, resulting in the West holding significant control 
over developing countries’ economic sovereignty (Murray, 2009). 
However, SAPs were widely criticised and found to be ineffective (Craig & Porter, 
2006; Hermes & Lensink, 2001; Killick, 1996, 1997). Policies failed to be ‘country 
owned’ (Koeberle, 2005; Leandro, Schafer, & Frontini, 1999) and even willing 
countries often lacked the capacity to carry out reforms (Morrissey 1999). 
Implementing institutions such as the IMF were sometimes seen as setting national 
agenda by bypassing a country's national decision making process (IMF, 2005) and 
thereby infringing on a country’s sovereignty. Reforms also failed to recognise the 
need for tailored approaches to countries with unique political, social and cultural 
environments (Sippel & Neuhoff, 2009; Wood & Lockwood, 1999). Other critiques 
of the SAPs include the reform measures’ ex ante nature (Koeberle, 2005) and the 
lack of penalties for non-compliance (Killick, 1997). 
Neoliberalism did not result in the economic growth it had promised. Its harsh 
austerity measures led to increases in poverty and inequalities, widening the gap 
between rich and poor (Dwivedi, Khator, & Nef, 2007; Kay & Gwynne, 2000; 
Murray, 2009). The Asian Crash of 1997 saw strong economic downturn, especially 
in Latin America, and resistance movements towards neoliberalism grew (Murray, 
2009).   
Consequently, the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC) began searching for alternatives to neoliberalism. Their findings 
recommended a place for the state but, like neoliberalism before it, neostructuralism 
still has a market focus. Neostructuralism promotes the use of participatory and 
democratic society to build a successful economy. This has been described as a 
neostructural means to meet a neoliberal end (Murray & Overton, 2011b: 317).  
Reforms advocating the inclusion of the state became known as the ‘Post-
Washington Consensus’, the policy embodiment of neostructuralism (Murray & 
Overton, 2011a).  
Neostructuralism spread as South American governments appealed to voters through 
social policies. Without the pressure of the cold war, the West did not resist these 
changes. Furthermore, concerned with terrorism post 9/11, the West encouraged 
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stable states as they were less likely to harbour terrorists (Murray & Overton, 
2011b). Neostructuralism has brought with it a strong focus on poverty and draws 
from participatory theory. Buzzwords such as participation, partnership and 
community have again become popular, although these are sometimes described as 
simply an attempt at making liberal approaches more inclusive (Craig & Porter, 
2003).  
Neostructuralism and its acceptance of the state aligned with the concept of ‘good 
governance’ (Murray & Overton, 2011b), emphasising human rights, transparency, 
accountability and democracy (Craig & Porter, 2006; Murray & Overton, 2011b). Its 
stress on accountability and transparency in particular (triggered by James 
Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank’s speech in 1996 on corruption) saw the 
aid community push for changes in management systems and the strengthening of 
audit institutions, public procurement and independent anti-corruption measures 
(Murray & Overton, 2011b; Pomerantz, 2011).  
Neostructuralism’s focus on poverty is demonstrated through the establishment of 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2000. These are a set of eight time-
bound and quantified goals for reducing poverty by 2015 endorsed by 189 states at 
the United Nations. They provide targets by which performance of aid can be 
measured. The Millennium Declaration demonstrated the shared ambitions of the 
global community for new global social policy of greater equity, social justice, and 
human rights (Poku & Whitman, 2011). The MDGs were also influential in 
increasing aid budgets. 
Under neoliberalism aid was cut in real terms. Its delivery was centred on project 
funding through civil society organisations such as NGOs (Murray & Overton, 
2011a). Aid increased under neostructuralism and donors (pressured by 
constituencies wanting to see aid spent appropriately) became concerned with 
effective aid delivery.  The Paris Declaration of 2005 (OECD, 2005) marked a major 
change in the way aid was to be delivered and administrated and represented a 
consensus amongst the aid community (Overton, Prinsen, Murray, & Wrighton, 
2012). The declaration established core principles of recipient ownership of 
development, donor alignment with recipient countries, donor harmonisation, 
accountability and managing for results. It reinforced the neostructural agenda in its 
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emphasis on the state as the leading actor in a country’s development rather than the 
market or civil society (Overton et al., 2012). Principles of ownership and alignment 
also hinted at a change in power relations (Murray & Overton, 2011b).  
2.3 Ownership 
It is widely acknowledged that ownership is crucial to successful development (IMF, 
2001; Killick, 2003; Leandro et al., 1999; World Bank, 1998). Ownership is now 
woven into documentation, policy, and international agreements. The Paris 
Declaration symbolises the new aid agenda's commitment to ownership in which 
ownership stands as its first principle. It is echoed throughout the document, filtering 
into and advising the declaration's commitments including the call for donors to 
harmonise and align with recipient processes (OECD, 2005). The focus on 
ownership can also be seen in the new aid modalities which aim to give greater 
recipient management of aid.  
Ownership can be applied at multiple levels (EURODAD, 2001: 3). It most often 
refers to the relationship between governments and donors, but it can also refer to 
those within a country, for example, between internal stakeholders such as Civil 
Society Organisations (CSOs), unions, private sector groups and the government 
(EURODAD, 2001). The place of internal stakeholders such as CSOs, local 
governments and the private sector is playing an increasingly important part in the 
ownership definition (OECD, 2008: 2), recognising the importance of their role for 
successful development (Smith, 2005). 
While ownership has been accepted as central to good development, its definition is 
often blurry and differs significantly between organisations. The ‘owner’ in 
'ownership' is often vague, it is difficult to know who represents a country when 
referring to ‘country ownership’ of development (Buiter, 2007). Is it still fair to say 
that development is ‘country owned’ if the country is run by a corrupt government 
which was not elected democratically (Buiter, 2007)? NGOs were largely excluded 
from the Paris Declaration (despite the declaration's commitment to local strategies 
already being implemented by NGOs (Warning & Post, 2007)). However they 
gained increased recognition in the Accra Agenda for Action (OECD, 2008: 1) as 
complementing the government and private sector as independent development 
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actors. The change in definition of ownership to "democratic ownership" in the 
Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan (OECD, 2011b: 5) saw the 
role of NGOs further highlighted, recognising that ownership of development 
includes broader national stakeholders, further increasing the role for CSOs in 
development (Council for International Development, 2012). 
Ownership, as a current buzzword, is subject to overuse. In practice, it is difficult to 
define and its application can often be tokenistic. It can mean anything from a 
country having designed and drafted its own programmes, to a country being 
informed of programmes drawn up by another party (Buiter, 2007). Donors often 
intend a particular definition, but then water this down, revealing that in practice 
they are not willing to cede control (de Renzio, Whitfield, & Bergamaschi, 2008). 
This vagueness around ownership’s definition means donors can be seen to uphold 
ownership while not substantially changing aspects of their aid relationship with 
recipients (Cramer, Stein, & Weeks, 2006). 
The different actors involved in aid relationships means that ownership carefully 
navigates and adapts to the intricate power relationships involved. For ownership to 
develop partnerships need to evolve and power imbalances need to be addressed: 
The form ownership takes and the problems of achieving it change over time. 
Whatever the form, ownership dynamics imply the renegotiation of 
partnerships to make them less unequal in bargaining power, more tolerant 
of differences in views, and based upon the recipient government and 
national stakeholders driving the development process  (Cramer et al., 2006: 
422). 
Hence, the concept of ownership is broad and ever evolving and differs according to 
parties involved, time and space. Therefore ownership can be viewed as both broad 
and relative:   
The concept of ‘ownership’ is a relative one. It really only makes sense when 
seen in the context of what happened before, and thus ownership can be seen 
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as moving away from the imposition of the content and process…11 by 
outsiders  (EURODAD, 2001: 3).  
Since ownership is difficult to define, it is necessarily difficult to measure. 
Separating what governments and donors have initiated and control is complicated 
given the development of aid relationships over a long time within changing aid 
systems (de Renzio et al., 2008).  
2.5 Change in Aid Modalities and Aid Management 
Under neostructuralism aid modalities have changed dramatically. A new focus on 
ownership and the acceptance of the state has meant that general budget support 
(GBS) (unearmarked aid to the government budget) has become the ultimate goal of 
aid. Various stages lead up to this pinnacle exist, such as Sector Wide Approaches 
(SWAps). Progress to GBS is analysed and evaluated by donors and external 
agencies and follows a Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRSP) - a development plan 
moulded to a donor approved template. The template PRSP path to GBS requires 
recipient countries to follow steps on a continuum which adopts Western systems of 
management and administration. However, the PRSP framework has the opportunity 
cost of different, perhaps more tailored approaches to development, as governments 
are forced to focus on best practice and its integration (Craig & Porter, 2003).  
PRSPs represent the Paris Declaration’s (OECD, 2005) primary measurement of 
ownership. Ironically, this is measured by donors rather than recipient countries 
(Venter, 2008) and consequently does not promote ownership (Zimmermann, 2008). 
Adopting a PRSP may only indicate that a developing country is following a donor-
paved path (Zimmermann, 2008). Moreover PRSPs could be accused of decreasing 
ownership by replacing national processes (Oxfam International, 2004). 
The new modalities are government administered. This not only reflects 
neostructuralism’s focus on the state but allows for a single point of contact for 
donors. The increase in ownership through means such as GBS demands a higher 
degree of consultation, dialogue and decision making with donors (Smith, 2005). 
                                                
11 “of structural adjustment programmes” was removed from the original so that the definition could be 
applicable to further situations. 
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However governments often do not have the capacity to deal with these bigger 
demands (Brown, Foster, Norton, & Naschold, 2001). Administration and public 
service, reduced under neoliberalism, has had to expand and be built up again. The 
expertise needed to meet donor expectations often calls for the use of technical 
assistants or expatriate staff. This has been described as a new kind of colonial 
occupation that undermines ownership (Overton et al., 2012).  
The new aid modality has affected NGOs differently. Neostructuralism’s focus on 
channelling aid through government has seen a decrease in focus on aid delivery by 
NGOs. Despite this the period 2001-2009 saw total Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) aid channelled to and through NGOs increase significantly.12 
Interestingly, only earmarked aid increased13 and core support remained constant 
(DAC/OECD, 2011). This supports the view that donors use NGOs to reach a 
specific development objective (DAC/OECD, 2011: 14).14 Neostructuralism has 
seen an increased focus on core support (GBS) for government but, with the state 
seen as the primary actor, this has not extended to NGOs.  
Both NGOs and government have been affected by the increased focus on managing 
for results and accountability which has in turn pushed for standardised aid practices. 
Aid relationships have begun to focus on standardised operating procedures and 
practices for accountability, results management and harmonisation (Bornstein, 
2006; Wallace, Bornstein, & Chapman, 2006). This includes a focus on pre-fixed 
results, reported through set formats and templates for project-management. Meeting 
global targets is important and increasingly funding is tied to the MDGs. 
A Wallace et al. (2006) study into the aid chain between donors and NGOs in the 
United Kingdom and recipients and field offices in Uganda and South Africa claims 
that the new approach shows a bias towards valuing systems and approaches 
                                                
12 From $US4.7 billion (in constant 2008 dollars) to $US9 billion (DAC/OECD, 2011: 20). 
13 Aid increased from $US2 to $US6.3 billion. These are only DAC estimates and only account for a portion of 
aid (they exclude aid from significant countries such as China and also transfers from metropolitan governments 
to territories and dependencies (Overton, Prinsen al. 2012).  
14 20 out of 25 donors hold that a "very important" or "important" objective for working with NGOs is "To reach 
a specific development objective (implement aid programmes) linked to service delivery" (DAC/OECD, 2011: 
14). 
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developed in the West. Tools and guidelines have such a strong influence that 
reporting for aid is often based on templates rather than analysing the challenges 
seen in development and reporting on the learning. Such inflexible systems can be 
difficult to follow and of no value for local use. They do not recognise local 
knowledge or views, and fail to capture complex relationships, cultural subtleties and 
context specificities. Local knowledge of staff, which is often verbally 
communicated, cannot be captured in the documentation-intensive system. The rigid 
processes mean that even if donors want to hear about success directly from the 
field, this is not normally possible.  
The study furthermore found that recipients in developing countries are often 
conflicted by trying to meet the demands of donors who control the funding stream, 
while also trying to find locally appropriate ways to address poverty. Significant 
time is spent for upward accountability and consultation despite the rhetoric of 
participation. However, these conditions, policies and procedures are often difficult 
to change but many NGOs comply with them as a global norm, while others disagree 
but follow them to access funding. 
The study’s example of the impact of the results management approach to aid 
administration highlights some of the ownership issues recipient countries are 
struggling with. Upward accountability and bureaucratic conditionalities may be 
impeding ownership. Murray and Overton (2011a) argue that the new aid agenda, 
with its focus on increased ownership and participation, has increased demands on 
recipient countries by setting new conditions to adhere to. Conditionality used in 
SAPs under neoliberalism was criticised as coercive, forcing governments to choose 
between protecting the welfare of its citizens by accepting aid and the conditions 
attached to it, or protecting its sovereignty (Kilby, 1999). The new conditions 
imposed could be criticised similarly.  
2.6 Monitoring and Evaluation  
The changes in aid direction and aid modalities, together with the influence of the 
Paris Declaration, have pushed for an increase and improvement of monitoring and 
evaluation systems. The PRSPs, with their focus on transparency and accountability 
(Craig & Porter, 2003) carrying heavy expectations of monitoring and evaluation, 
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have been a catalyst for its improvement (Holvoet & Renard, 2007). Strong 
recipient-led monitoring and evaluation is required to improve ownership, to 
encourage donor alignment, to increase accountability and to allow for results 
management. However, as seen in sub-Saharan Africa, monitoring and evaluation 
may be one of the weaker adopted practices of the new aid paradigm (Holvoet & 
Renard, 2007). 
2.6.1 Ownership 
Recipient-led monitoring and evaluation systems support the Paris Declaration 
(Feinstein, 2009; Holvoet, Gildemyn, & Inberg, 2012) including the ownership 
principle which stipulates that recipient countries need to lead the coordination of 
their aid (OECD, 2005). Recipient-led systems allow locally identified data to be 
collected which may differ from that chosen by donors. Accordingly, this data is 
most likely to be data that meets local evaluation needs (Lundgren & Kennedy, 
2009).  Furthermore, local leadership of the process allows for sustainability of 
evaluation systems (Lundgren & Kennedy, 2009) and gives the recipient country a 
tool for evaluating the new aid modality (Feinstein, 2009). 
Although ownership of monitoring and evaluation requires recipient initiation and 
agenda setting (Lundgren & Kennedy, 2009), in practice, it has been suggested that 
this may need to be encouraged by donors as current adoption of the practice is slow 
(Feinstein, 2009). The Accra Agenda for Action specifies this area for development, 
requesting donors to support the strengthening of national information systems 
(OECD, 2008). It has been suggested that capacity can be built through training, 
technical and financial support, and joint-evaluations (Lundgren & Kennedy, 2009). 
However, such training may impede the development of unique monitoring and 
evaluation systems and simply replicate donor practices. It is imperative that 
evaluation systems are locally tailored in order to be sustainable (Lundgren & 
Kennedy, 2009) and support ownership.  
2.6.2 Harmonisation and Alignment  
The Paris Declaration principle of harmonisation urges donors to coordinate thereby 
simplifying procedures and sharing information (DAC/OECD, 2011). Harmonisation 
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avoids duplication which, in terms of monitoring and evaluation, translates to fewer 
overall reporting requirements from multiple donors and a reduction in transaction 
costs for recipient countries (Holvoet et al., 2012). Donors, however, have been 
found to be slow to harmonise for monitoring and evaluation procedures (Holvoet et 
al., 2012). 
Alignment calls for donors to reduce parallel systems and align with recipients' 
systems (OECD, 2005). Alignment, like harmonisation, can reduce high transaction 
costs resulting from a multitude of donors carrying out the same processes 
(Feinstein, 2009).   
In practice it has been shown that donors are reluctant to commit to recipients’ 
monitoring and evaluation systems (OECD, 2011a as cited in Holvoet et al., 2012: 
750). Holvoet and Renard (2007) describe donors' situation as a chicken and egg 
scenario. One the one hand, donors will resist alignment if recipient countries do not 
hold a minimum institutional capacity for monitoring and evaluation (Holvoet & 
Renard, 2007). On the other hand, the downsizing and alignment of donors' systems 
is crucial in the strengthening of recipient institutional capacity (Holvoet et al., 2012; 
Holvoet & Renard, 2007). However evidence has shown that donors are slow to use 
country systems as they prefer to practice “risk avoidance” rather than “risk 
management” (OECD, 2011a: 52) and donors vary as to how much risk they will 
take. By the same token, there is little evidence proving that donors are more likely 
to use country systems if they are of sound quality (OECD, 2011a: 41). 
2.6.3 Accountability 
The increase in focus on good governance and the change in aid modalities to 
broader funding such as GBS, have resulted in an increased demand for transparency 
and accountability (Kusek & Rist, 2004), including downward accountability 
(Holvoet & Renard, 2007; Holvoet & Rombouts, 2008). The Paris Declaration 
highlights this concern in its increased focus on accountability (Holvoet et al., 2012). 
Constituents and donors are concerned that aid is used effectively and is not 
absorbed by corruption. Good monitoring and evaluation is a fundamental tool in 
increasing accountability and reducing corruption which in turn reduces transaction 
costs, allowing for greater aid effectiveness (Adrien & Jobin, 2009). However, the 
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increase in donor demands under the new aid agenda could have a negative effect on 
accountability. An exploratory study into NGOs’ accountability in Uganda (Burger 
& Owens, 2010) investigating inaccuracies in reported financial transparency and 
participation found that unrealistic donor demands could stand as an obstacle to 
transparency. Therefore, an increased focus on accountability and transparency 
through increased demands could simultaneously undermine this same focus.    
2.6.4 Results Management 
The Paris Declaration principle of measuring for results focuses on "managing and 
implementing aid in a way that focuses on the desired results and uses information to 
improve decision-making" (OECD, 2005: 7). Good monitoring and evaluation 
systems are essential for results-based budgeting and management.   
This strong focus on results management stemmed from a branch of New Public 
Management. This "emphasises the importance of defining expected results with the 
involvement of key stakeholders” (Hatton & Schroeder, 2007: 427)  and involves a 
strong monitoring and evaluation component which includes “monitoring 
programmes designed to achieve these results through the use of appropriate 
indicators, reporting on performance in achieving results, and acting on performance 
information" (Hatton & Schroeder, 2007: 427). Results-based management has been 
adopted widely by donors, multilateral agencies and NGOs (Hatton & Schroeder, 
2007). However this focus on results and linking policy measures to specific 
outcomes raised concerns around the web of factors that contribute to outcomes. For 
example, outcomes are affected by access to reliable and timely data, the ability to 
develop meaningful indicators, exogenous shocks and the lag effect of changes in 
economic, environmental and social changes (Koeberle, 2005). Furthermore, as 
Koeberle (2005) points out with reference to policy-based lending, it is difficult to 
ascertain what would have happened if a programme or project were not carried out. 
EURODAD (2008) has found that the European Commission’s move to focus on 
results has led to increased monitoring and evaluation challenges including 
insufficient funding, data and disclosure of data. Despite the push for recipient-led 
systems, indicators are often selected by donors (e.g. MDGs, Paris Declaration and 
indicators for SWAps and GBS (EURODAD, 2008; Smith, 2005; Venter, 2008)). 
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They are mainly quantitative (EURODAD, 2008; Smith, 2005) and can be 
insufficient in their representation of the full picture (EURODAD, 2008). Easy to 
access data, which is often used, is not always suitable for local priorities (Smith, 
2005). Moreover, the change to results-based approach has often seen an overall 
increase in the extent of monitoring and the number of indicators (EURODAD, 
2008). 
2.6.5 Summary of Monitoring and Evaluation 
The new aid agenda calls for better monitoring and evaluation. Improvements are 
needed in order to meet higher demands for accountability, allow for use of the new 
results-management framework, encourage donor alignment and give recipient 
countries a new tool for ownership. Unfortunately, in practice, the heavy 
requirements of the limited monitoring and evaluation systems of recipient countries 
contradict the agenda’s own rhetoric around increased ownership. 
2.7 Vanuatu and the Pacific 
2.7.1 Neoliberalism and Neostructuralism 
The Pacific experienced global aid trends, although later than the rest of the world. 
The SAPs of the 1980s and early 1990s were enforced in the Pacific in the mid-
1990s (Murray & Overton, 2011a). Between 1995-1998 the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) moved from supporting sector and project lending to macroeconomic 
stabilisation and structural adjustment in the Pacific (Knapman & Saldanha, 1999).  
For example the Cook Islands was forced to cut the size of its civil service by 57% 
(Knapman & Saldanha, 1999) after a significant cut in its budgetary support was 
imposed (Murray & Overton, 2011a). The neoliberal practice of trade liberalisation 
was enforced when Pacific Island countries were no longer granted preferential 
trading for their key industries (Murray & Overton, 2011a). The good governance 
agenda was present, through public sector reform and a focus on accountability and 
corruption (Larmour, 2005). 
Vanuatu, in seeking outside support, accepted an SAP in 1997 in the form of a 
Comprehensive Reform Program (CRP) with the ADB. The policies included 
represent a neoliberal agenda, emphasising privatisation, corporatisation, and 
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economic liberalisation (Gay, 2014). The public service decreased by 10% from 
4,250 to 3,825 (Knapman & Saldanha, 1999). Identical packages were rolled out in 
other Pacific Island countries such as Samoa and the Solomon Islands (Gay, 2014). 
The reform includes a focus on good governance in order to make the public sector 
more modern and accountable (Gay, 2004). Good governance has been highlighted 
as a key priority area for Vanuatu as outlined in the Priorities and Action Agenda 
2006 – 2015 (Government of the Republic of Vanuatu, 2006).   
Vanuatu’s CRP has been criticised as “poorly focused” (Pacific Institute of Public 
Policy, 2009: 4) as few resources were identified to finance the objectives listed. The 
CRP resulted in a worsening fiscal situation (Gay, 2004) and Gay (2014) found that 
despite the ADB’s assessment of continuous consultation and media coverage (ADB, 
1999) many people felt they were not properly consulted on the reforms. 
Furthermore, the CRP failed to take into account the local context, especially 
features unique to Vanuatu such as kastom, the use of money and land ownership 
(Gay, 2014). 
Neoliberal land reform was also promoted by donors in the Pacific, undermining the 
relationships that local people have with their land (Murray & Overton, 2011a). A 
land registration scheme introduced in Vanuatu has been created “for Vanuatu to 
develop economically and be attractive to investors”, to further Vanuatu’s economy 
rather than benefit Ni-Vanuatu (Daley, 2010: 35). Land is central to Ni-Vanuatu 
identity (Leach, 2013) and the current land model, driven by foreign investors, 
threatens Ni-Vanuatu control of their land and development futures (Daley, 2010). 
The neostructural agenda experienced on the global stage also began to have a 
presence in the Pacific. Rebuilding the state became central to security concerns 
around deemed ‘unstable states’ (Dobell, 2007) in Australia’s ‘arc of instability’ 
extending from East Timor through Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and 
Vanuatu to New Caledonia and Fiji (Dobell, 2007; Murray & Overton, 2011a). 
Furthermore, the poverty agenda became particularly evident when it was adopted 
by Australia and New Zealand, major aid donors to the Pacific, in the late 1990s 
(Murray & Overton, 2011a).  Neostructuralism and the poverty agenda can be seen 
in Pacific Islands’ focus on the MDGs (Murray & Overton, 2011a) and actions such 
as the establishment of the Pacific Aid Effectiveness Principles in Koror, Palau in 
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2007. These reflect the principles of the Paris Declaration but add some regional 
elements such as the role of technical assistance (Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 
2007). Off-track in meeting the MDGs, the Pacific Islands Forum met in Cairns to 
discuss the Pacific Plan and signed the Cairns Compact (Pacific Islands Forum 
Secretariat, 2009), an agreement that reinforced the Paris Declaration, the Accra 
Agenda for Action and commitment to the MDGs.  
This adoption of the neostructuralist poverty agenda together with the presence of 
neoliberal trade reforms and CRPs demonstrates a neostructuralist façade in the 
Pacific with underlying neoliberal tones (Murray & Overton, 2011a). 
2.7.2 The Inverse Sovereignty Effect 
The new aid modalities and aid management has increased administration 
requirements such as policy frameworks and financial and auditing systems for 
limited Pacific Island bureaucracies (Murray & Overton, 2011a). Murray and 
Overton (2011a) suggest neostructuralism’s push for ownership, while 
simultaneously imposing heavy demands, creates an “inverse sovereignty effect” 
whereby an aid paradigm which advocates ownership is actually undermining 
recipient sovereignty. This effect is particularly experienced in the Pacific where the 
limited size of bureaucracies may struggle to meet such demands.  
2.7.3 Vanuatu: Monitoring and Evaluation 
Vanuatu’s government has limited monitoring and evaluation capacity. This presents 
a challenge in monitoring the development outcomes of newly implemented policies 
(Prime Minister's Office, 2010b). Vanuatu received a C15 for its result-orientated 
framework (indicator 11 of the Paris Declaration (OECD, 2011c)) , held back by the 
poor quality of development information and the incomprehensive coverage of 
indicators for its national development strategy. Challenges around up-skilling for 
data collection and computation were also highlighted. Moreover, stakeholder access 
to information was seen as poor, with few materials in Bislama and it was suggested 
                                                
15 The World Bank accesses this score from evidence provided by the government, with A being the highest 
score and E the lowest.  
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that information contained in monitoring and evaluation reports was not being used 
to its full advantage.  
However, the Government of Vanuatu has sought to improve its monitoring and 
evaluation. In recognising the need for accountability and transparency for good 
governance and the need to move towards evidence-based policy making (Prime 
Minister's Office, 2010b) the government has established a Monitoring and 
Evaluation Unit together with a government Monitoring and Evaluation Policy 
(Prime Minister's Office, 2010b). The unit collates data collected by individual line 
ministries and is responsible for the planning, monitoring and evaluation of the 
economic and development agenda of the Government (Pacific Institute of Public 
Policy, 2009). The goal is to, “improve efficiency and effectiveness of service 
delivery” (Prime Minister's Office, 2010b: 5) through the promotion of 
accountability, learning, feedback and sharing knowledge around results. The 
forming of the Monitoring and Evaluation Unit together with the Monitoring and 
Evaluation Policy has the potential is an important step forward for Vanuatu in 
increasing ownership of its development.  
2.7.4 Alignment and Harmonisation 
The literature has shown that alignment is critical to increasing ownership. While 
Vanuatu’s monitoring and evaluation capacity is limited, Vanuatu’s budget and 
Public Financial Management (PFM) systems are sophisticated and seen as best 
practice in the region (Pacific Institute of Public Policy, 2009). The OECD (2011c) 
survey on Vanuatu, Aid Effectiveness 2011: Progress in Implementing the Paris 
Declaration found that Vanuatu met its 2010 MDG target for reliability of country 
PFM systems.16  In 2010, 31% of aid to the government sector used country PFM 
systems (OECD, 2011c). Donors noted the weak capacity of line ministries in budget 
execution, financial reporting and auditing as reasons for not channelling more aid 
within the systems. Despite the assessment of Vanuatu’s PFM systems, in 2010 there 
were nine parallel project implementation units (PIUs) set up avowedly due to weak 
                                                
16 Vanuatu received a score of 4 for the quality of its Public Financial Management systems (with 1 being very 
weak and 6 being very strong). 
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capacity environments that cannot ensure implementation efficiency nor guarantee 
the correct and transparent use of funds (OECD, 2011c). Vanuatu did not participate 
in the same survey in 2006 and 2008; therefore it is difficult to ascertain whether 
alignment in these areas is improving. 
Lack of harmonisation has also been highlighted as an obstacle to development. 
Demands around meeting multiple donors’ requests or consultations place a heavy 
burden on recipient countries’ resources (OECD, 2011a), especially in small Pacific 
Island Nations (Murray & Overton, 2011a; Wrighton, 2010; Wrighton & Overton, 
2012). Harmonisation, therefore, is central to aid effectiveness, as ratified by the 
Paris Declaration (OECD, 2005). In Vanuatu, donors performed poorly in their 
ability to conduct joint missions, whereby only 23% of the 59 donor missions in 
2010 were jointly conducted (OECD, 2011c). Individual donors’ interests, language 
issues and internal procedures have been put forward as barriers to joint missions 
(OECD, 2011c). Despite the poor performance in joint missions, donors were closer 
to their target in joint analytical work (Indicator 10b). This includes country studies, 
evaluations and discussion papers. Donors coordinated 60% of analytical work in 
2010, just short of their 66% target (OECD, 2011c). 
2.7.5 Vanuatu and the Pacific: Concluding Comments 
Vanuatu and the Pacific have been subject to global aid trends. Neoliberalism’s 
presence is seen most clearly through the CRPs accepted by many Pacific nations 
including Vanuatu. However, Vanuatu’s CRP has been criticised due to the lack of 
consultation in its development and its inability to account for the local context 
(Gay, 2014). Similar to the global experience with SAPs, these criticisms highlight 
the lack of ownership in Vanuatu’s CRP. The neostructural agenda is seen in the 
Pacific through the poverty focus and adoption of the MDGs. The recognition of the 
need for aid effectiveness has seen Vanuatu move towards evidence based policy 
making by establishing a Monitoring and Evaluation Unit. It is difficult to ascertain 
the degree to which donors are supporting Vanuatu’s country systems as there is 
limited information available on alignment for comparisons over time (OECD, 
2011c). However, donors appear to be harmonising on joint analytical work which, 
in theory, would benefit Vanuatu by reducing the amount of duplicate reporting. The 
limited research available on Vanuatu leaves room for further research around the 
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extent to which the neostructural agenda’s focus on ownership is being played out in 
the practice of monitoring and evaluation.  
2.8 Conclusion 
In summary, two major aid paradigms, neoliberalism and neostructuralism have 
contributed to current aid practices. While neostructuralism has pushed for a greater 
focus on poverty and the state, neoliberal undertones still exist. Ownership has been 
highlighted under the new aid agenda. However monitoring and evaluation 
obligations imposed on recipient countries mean that the current delivery of aid 
undermines the very principles the agenda seeks to uphold. Current monitoring and 
evaluation practices reflect poor recipient ownership and donors are furthermore 
reluctant to align with recipient systems. The Pacific and Vanuatu have experienced 
the global aid trends of neoliberalism and neostructuralism. The results management 
agenda has been adopted and Vanuatu is seeking to improve its monitoring and 
evaluation practices. However, the extent to which ownership is exercised in these 
practices leaves a gap within the literature to be explored.  
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Methodology 
3.1 Introduction  
In conducting research in Vanuatu, an appropriate methodology is imperative. This 
chapter begins by explaining my epistemological stance which shapes the research’s 
approaches, analysis, interpretation and dissemination (Chilisa, 2012). It then goes 
on to explore reflexivity and the impact of my positionality on the research. Ethics 
procedures are highlighted and ethical concerns are woven throughout the chapter, 
recognising that ethics is not an isolated process but present throughout the study 
(Smith, 2006). Storian, a methodology anchored in Vanuatu, is then explored before 
methods used are expanded. Finally, the chapter concludes with consideration of the 
limitations of the methodology.  
3.2 Epistemology and Knowledge 
The research’s epistemological stance is based on social constructivism (see Berger 
and Luckmann (1967); Lincoln and Guba (1985)). Social constructivism holds that 
individuals seek understandings through the world around them and develop varied 
and multiple subjective meanings of their experience (Creswell, 2009: 8). These 
meanings “are not simply imprinted on individuals but are formed through 
interaction with others (hence social constructivism) and through historical and 
cultural norms that operate in individuals’ lives” (Creswell, 2009: 8).  
Feminist and indigenous paradigms add to this epistemology. In particular, the work 
of feminists on positionality and reflexivity (Gilbert, 1994; Kobayashi, 1994; 
Madge, 1993; McDowell, 1992a, 1992b; McLafferty, 1995; Rose, 1997) and 
indigenous authors on indigenous paradigms (Chilisa, 2012: 13; Farrelly & Nabobo-
Baba, 2012; Gegeo & Watson-Gegeo, 2002; Smith, 1999) who recognise a 
completely different way of knowing and therefore the need for different research 
processes. In acknowledging indigenous paradigms I reject modernisation theory, 
that countries should follow a linear development path modelled on the West. 
Despite this, I recognise that the research focuses on a Western tool of development: 
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the aid practice of monitoring and evaluation. However, it tries to present this 
research from an indigenous perspective through the voices of the participants.  
My epistemological stance contributes to the employment of reflexivity, the adoption 
of an appropriate methodology and the use of qualitative methods.  
3.3 Reflexivity and Positionality 
Reflexivity was recognised as an ongoing process and therefore was continually 
practiced throughout the research. I was constantly reflecting on and attempting to 
better understand my positionality: how my actions, my history and my identity 
affected the research. Contrary to positivist assumptions of neutrality, social 
constructivism recognises that research cannot help but be biased and value laden 
(Chilisa, 2012; Creswell, 2009);  positionality shapes how we look at the world and 
therefore how we carry out research. Therefore, it is important to understand one’s 
positionality and to learn from it (Schoenberger, 1992). Moreover, being aware of 
positionality and reflexivity is needed to address power imbalances (Chacko, 2004). 
However, Rose (1997) reminds us that we cannot assume to be so self-aware as to 
know the full impact of our positionality on our research. There are many questions 
that reflexivity seeks to answer but “the answers are so massive, the questions are so 
presumptuous about the reflective, analytical power of the researcher, that I want to 
say that they should be simply unanswerable: we should not imagine we can answer 
them” (Rose, 1997: 311). 
3.3.1 Ko Wai Au? 
Before I explore the impact of my positionality, I will briefly introduce myself, so 
that the reader is aware of who is conducting this research. Such practice is 
important in a Māori context, answering ko wai au? Who am I? This translates 
beyond my name to where I come from, which determines who I am.  
Ko Taranaki te maunga 
Ko Matanehunehu te awa 
Ko Taranaki te iwi 
Ko Ngā Mahanga te hapū 
Ko Puniho, ko Oakura ngā marae 
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I am of British and Māori decent. My parents are Chris Nichol and Shona Geary who 
are both from Dunedin. I am the youngest of three girls, brought up in Christchurch 
and Wellington. I have spent time living overseas in Italy and Vanuatu and these 
countries have become second homes to me, with the people there becoming family. 
Although this introduction is brief, it is important in illustrating who I am, shaped by 
my history, family and those before me (Webber, 2006). 
3.3.2 Multiple Identities 
My history, family and those before me have framed my multiple identities. The 
concept of multiple identities has been raised frequently, particularly in feminist 
literature (Chacko, 2004; Haraway, 1991; Madge, 1993; Reinharz, 1997; Rose, 
1997). My multiple identities had different impacts on the research.  
My education, and perhaps the colour of my skin, meant that I had relatively easy 
access to information and people in Vanuatu. Sidaway (1992) notes that in the field, 
researchers often move to a different hierarchy in society. I realised it was possible 
for me to walk into a government department, without contacts, and ask for a 
meeting. However when considering this, Wrighton (2010: 15) always rang in my 
ears:  
The ease of access to officials is one reason why they are so busy seeing 
people who call in. It is possible to knock on the door of the Secretary to 
Government, ask if he is free for a few moments and then take up his time on 
matters of note to you. I doubt that any senior official in any of the donor 
countries is able to be accessed quite so simply. 
If I could not do this in my own country, why would it then be acceptable to do this 
in Vanuatu?  I was constantly reflecting on this point in Port Vila, where I did not 
feel comfortable approaching a department without prior contact or on the basis of a 
recommendation. While I undoubtedly missed out on interviews as a result, I did not 
want to recruit participants in this way.  
In the street and around town, the colour of my skin was a clear indicator of the fact 
that I was an outsider. I was aware of some of the local perceptions of white people, 
based on the expatriate community, the tourists, the aid workers, the resort owners 
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and the condominium administration. I got used to being referred to as ‘misis’, a 
colonial term loosely meaning “female expatriate and/or employer” (Rodman, 2007: 
1). Being called ‘misis’ and the association of the colour of my skin always made me 
feel a little uneasy and overly eager to disprove negative stereotypes. I sought to do 
this by speaking Bislama, demonstrating my basic understandings of kastom and 
how things work in Vanuatu picked up from my time living there. 
The participants did not make me feel the burden of the ‘misis’ label. They were 
used to working with foreigners in their offices. I felt that the participants respected 
that I had spent time living in Vanuatu. Having been a Volunteer Service Abroad 
(VSA) volunteer distinguished me in Luganville where almost every NGO and 
government department has had a VSA volunteer working either with them or 
nearby.  Furthermore, having worked in an NGO in Vanuatu made me feel like more 
of an ‘insider’. NGO participants spoke as if I knew their work, as became evident in 
our conversations and the use of “you know” throughout the interviews.  
3.4 Power 
Recent literature on power draws attention to the higher status, the education and the 
luxuries of the researcher compared to her participants (Gilbert, 1994; Kobayashi, 
1994). However, in the case of this research, I was interviewing skilled 
professionals. The participants generally had undertaken more educattion than me 
and all were more experienced in their work. 
I felt that being a young researcher also freed me from some of the power 
imbalances and the weight of the ‘misis’ label. Similar to Jones’ field research 
experience in Fiji (Jones, 2012: 13), researching in a culture which emphasizes 
respect for elders meant that being young was somewhat liberating. I was initially 
worried that being younger made me less credible as I clearly would not have the 
same experience as an older researcher and therefore may not have seemed worthy 
of participants’ time. However, the participants never made me feel like this. On the 
contrary, they were really supportive and interested in the research. Many interviews 
ended with conversations about the participant’s study (usually abroad) and with 
participants giving me advice as to the next step in my career. I recognise, however, 
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that the participants were not representative of the population, and outside of the 
interviews I often felt uncomfortable about different statuses. 
Despite the status of my participants, I still sought to even power relations with 
regard to how the research was carried out. Interviews were conducted on 
participants' terms: they set the time and place. I also asked the participants initially 
recruited what they would like to get out of this research, to help me better focus the 
study for their needs. Participants were always given the option to pull out should 
they have felt uncomfortable with any of the processes or information shared.  
3.5 Rationale for Research 
I have discussed my personal reasons for wanting to conduct the research in the 
preface to this thesis. However, feminist and indigenous writers (e.g. Chacko (2004); 
Chilisa (2012); Hutchings (2010); Smith (1999)) had me constantly reflecting on 
whether I was the right person for the study and whether I was conducting the work 
in the right way. While I do believe the research was more than just ‘new academic 
tourism’(Mowforth & Munt, 1998), I cannot deny that some of the drivers of the 
research were personal interests and career advancement (Chacko, 2004: 59). This 
became particularly evident when I realised that the undertaking was consistently 
referred to as “my research”, language implying ownership despite my recognition 
that the data belongs to the participants and the study aims to be for their use.   
The research gave participants the opportunity to express their opinion, and have it 
documented as something that could inform the general literature and contribute to 
informing monitoring and evaluation practice. The two part aim of the research, to 
reflect on current practice (the place of ownership) and to make recommendations 
(how ownership can increase) sought to be useful to participants both reflecting and 
looking forward. However, the recommendations discussed in the conclusions do not 
intend to “label, name, condemn, describe, or prescribe solutions or challenges…” 
(Chilisa, 2012: 7). They are, rather, broad recommendations drawn out from the 
participants’ comments and leave space for the reader to interpret them for their own 
context. 
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I recognised that the research added to the many demands of each participant’s work 
day. In researching a practice that has already been flagged as a burden to Ni-
Vanuatu government employees (Prime Minister's Office, 2010a), I saw that this 
work could also be viewed in the same way. However participants had the right to 
decline participation (which many did) and others found they could not commit to 
the interviews as they had other engagements. I was relieved to note that the 
participants who did take part showed a strong interest in the topic and in taking part. 
They all commented on the importance of monitoring and evaluation and requested a 
summary of the findings.   
I constantly questioned whether I should ethically be researching in the context of 
Vanuatu. However I found that focusing on the work of NGOs and government 
departments meant that I was not a complete 'outsider' to the context. Murray and 
Overton (2003) discuss the ‘foreignness’ of a researcher to her participants’ context 
as on a continuum “influenced by cultural, life-cycle, gender and geographical 
factors” (Murray & Overton, 2003: 18). Having had experience working in the NGO 
sector in Vanuatu, I was relatively familiar with the area of research and the work of 
the participants. Furthermore I had contacts in Vanuatu working in this field. I would 
not have had the same experience (or linguistic ability as later explained) to research 
other aspects of Vanuatu and could not have justified researching a topic that was 
further ‘foreign’ to me. 
3.6 Ethics 
The Vanuatu Cultural Council’s guiding principles helped steer the overall research 
ethically, particularly the methods17. A formal university ethics process was also 
followed, as required, which allowed me to reflect on ethical issues ensuring the 
research always respected the participants. Ethics approval was sought through the 
Victoria University of Wellington Human Ethics Committee which reviewed the 
research questions and processes before granting approval on the 20th of March, 
2013. However following Smith’s (2006) explanation of ethics in Kaupapa Māori, I 
recognised that ethical behaviour extends beyond the formal university process of 
                                                
17 I was not official bound to these principles as the research topic fell outside of the scope of the Vanuatu 
Cultural Council’s “cultural research” definition (Vanuatu National Cultural Council, 2009: 36). 
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obtaining ethics approval for a set of questions. One is forever bound to ethical 
behaviour around the research (Smith, 2006).  
Free, prior and informed consent is imperative when working with indigenous 
communities. On top of this, consent is always an ongoing negotiation and can 
change (Mead, 2006). An information sheet along with a consent form was written 
up18 to be signed by participants. The forms were written in English which I thought 
was appropriate given that all participants interviewed worked with English 
documents. However, in hindsight I should have provided the document in both 
English and Bislama. Participants were always verbally informed of the research, the 
process involved and the research’s use. Verbal consent was always sought to take 
part in the research, but the consent form was not always used, especially when 
interviews were unplanned. Participants did not always feel comfortable signing the 
consent form and therefore some did not sign. Despite its necessity for university 
ethics approval, I found that it wasn’t the most suitable approach for the Vanuatu 
context.  
Participants’ name, position and organisation remained anonymous in the research in 
order for them to feel comfortable to express their opinions. They are represented in 
the research by the type of organisation they work for and a letter of the alphabet e.g. 
NGO Employee A or Government Employee A. While expressing each participant’s 
position and workplace would be helpful for the reader, in a country with such a 
small population this extra information would take away anonymity (King & 
Horrocks, 2010) and so, in the interest of respecting the participant first, this 
information was withheld. 
3.7 Storian  
Talanoa has recently gained significant attention in academic literature (Farrelly & 
Nabobo-Baba, 2012; Halapua, 2000; Robinson & Robinson, 2005; Vaioleti, 2006) 
and is now perhaps the most prominent methodology used in the Pacific (Farrelly & 
Nabobo-Baba, 2012: 2).  Storian is Vanuatu’s form of talanoa (Warrick, 2009) and 
was adopted as a methodology for this research. Like talanoa, storian involves and 
translates to swapping stories, talking and yarning (Crowley, 1995: 235; as cited in 
                                                
18 See Appendix I for the consent form. 
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Warrick, 2009: 83). Storian lends to less formal qualitative methods: “Storian is an 
umbrella term indicating semi-structured interview, informal interview, and 
opportunistic discussion as part of observation” (Warrick, 2009: 83). An advantage 
of a storian methodology is that it “allows people’s perspectives to be more 
adequately reflected as they talk around the topic in their own way” (Warrick, 2009: 
84). However, like talanoa, storian is more than just “informal open-ended 
interviews” (Farrelly & Nabobo-Baba, 2012: 1). Central to storian is relationships: 
“Irrespective of specific method, the central feature of storian is building rapport 
with participants” (Warrick, 2009: 83). Therefore the two methodologies, storian 
and talanoa, have a strong emphasis on being physically present (Halapua, 2000).  
Other indigenous methodologies hold similar emphases. Kanohi kitea in kaupapa 
Māori stresses the importance of face-to-face communication for participants to be 
able to assess the subject of the research using all senses (Cram & Pipi, 2000 as cited 
in Cram, 2009:314). Furthermore, kanohi kitea promotes relationship building and 
being physically seen around the community (Cram, 2009). In following a storian 
methodology and exercising indigenous values such as kanohi kitea, it was important 
for me to conduct interviews face-to-face, for participants to be able to meet me and 
fully assess whether they wanted to be part of the research. Furthermore, the 
methodologies served as a reminder of the importance of building relationships and 
the value of yarning, chatting and getting to know each other before tackling the 
issues of the research. By the end of each interview, I had gotten to know many of 
the participants quite well and some interviews extended significantly past the 
formal questions while we chatted about our lives. 
3.8 Bislama 
Bislama is used almost everywhere in Vanuatu as lingua franca (Crowley, 2000). 
Being fluent in the language (in terms of speaking it effortlessly and with continuous 
performance (Byrnes, 2012: 509)) enabled me to engage more deeply than speaking 
English alone would have allowed. It enabled me to chat, to be less formal and to 
talk around the topic while the participant directed what part of the topic they wanted 
to focus on (Warrick, 2009: 84-85). In other words, Bislama enabled me to storian. 
As the majority of words in Bislama are based on English (Crowley, 2004) and many 
new terms with regards to organisational processes are expressed in English, my 
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topic was relatively easy to discuss. However, had the research focused on another 
topic, for example land, I would have struggled to discuss the research with fluency. 
Linguistically speaking (disregarding the inappropriateness of my researching land) I 
would not have had the lexicon (land concepts in Bislama would not have borrowed 
so heavily from English) nor the ‘conceptual competence’ (the ability to use and 
understand abstract concepts and figurative language (Andreou & Galantomos, 
2009)) to research land issues. Despite my confidence in my ability to storian about 
monitoring and evaluation, I do recognise the potential to have missed nuanced 
meaning by conducting many of the interviews in a language other than my mother 
tongue (Rossman & Rallis, 2003). 
Mooko comments that the use of European languages reflects the colonial 
experience and rulers (Mooko, 2009). Conducting interviews in Bislama was one 
strategy for avoiding this. However I quickly found that most government and NGO 
workers could speak English very well and other (non Ni-Vanuatu) participants 
spoke English better than Bislama. In fact, some interviewees preferred to be 
interviewed in English. As a result I considered each interview individually before 
deciding which language to use. Approximately half of the interviews were carried 
out in Bislama and half in English, although most involved a mix of the two 
languages. I believe that my understanding of Bislama still allowed me to use 
English in a way that enabled the storian approach inherent in Bislama. 
While speaking Bislama had obvious professional benefits, it had personal benefits 
too (Leslie & Storey, 2003). It helped me get by day to day and to meet people. For 
example, I was able to chat with the manager of my accommodation and discuss 
news with the women working in the nearby store. The ability to speak the local 
language significantly decreased any sense of isolation.  
I recognise that writing the thesis in English reinforces the colonial experience. As 
has been highlighted by Gegeo and Watson-Gegeo (2002) in the Kwara’ae culture, 
simple translations of some indigenous concepts into dominant languages do not 
allow for the same idea and feelings to be transferred. Therefore Ni-Vanuatu 
concepts that do not translate well into English, such as kastom, have remained in the 
text in Bislama as opposed to ‘colonising’ them into English. This is the reason for 
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the absence of a glossary in this thesis: a simple translation would not allow for Ni-
Vanuatu concepts’ full meaning to be understood.  
I did not employ a translator for the fieldwork as I did not believe it to be necessary 
given the research topic, my command of Bislama and the participants’ strong 
command of English. When being interviewed in Bislama, participants were always 
very patient with me and expanded or explained ideas if something was not 
completely clear. Many also encouraged me to email them if I needed anything 
clarified again later. Translators have also been described as having a role as a 
'cultural broker' (Temple & Young, 2004). However, I did not find this necessary. I 
was familiar with the workplaces of the participants and the topic we were 
discussing. Furthermore, participants and the workplaces I entered were used to 
working with researchers.  
While I did not use a translator during my fieldwork, I did ask a Ni-Vanuatu 
translator in Wellington to examine the translations used within the thesis. While this 
could be criticised as I had, at that point, already selected quotes from the 
participants, I did feel that I had understood all the conversations clearly. Quotes 
were entered into the thesis verbatim and many involve a mix of English and 
Bislama. In order to emphasise the participants’ voices quotes in Bislama are left in 
Bislama throughout the thesis, with footnotes used for translations.  
3.9 Methods 
My epistemological stance, methodology and the nature of the research questions led 
me to employ qualitative methods. Such methods allow the research to display the 
complexity of a situation while focusing on individual meanings (Creswell, 2007). 
Qualitative methods allow the participants, as opposed to the researcher, a greater 
role in directing the focus of the topic (Creswell, 2009). Research was undertaken 
through a literature review and raw data was collected through semi-structured 
interviews. The findings were then analysed and presented.  
3.9.1 Literature Review 
The literature review played an important part in analysing the current writing in the 
field, recognising areas for further research, and areas of contention. However, it 
40 
 
must be acknowledged that much of the literature on developing countries has been 
developed by outsiders frequently through methods that gave no voice to the 
‘researched’ in how they were represented, often creating unfavourable ‘knowledge’ 
to those researched (Chilisa, 2012). Wide readings of the literature and extending the 
review beyond solely academic articles allowed for alternative understandings of 
issues. Consequently I actively reflected on the way that I used literature and wrote it 
up, determined not to compound this ‘knowledge’ unfavourably.  
3.9.2 Recruitment 
Initially recruitment was conducted by emailing a letter to potential participants 
outlining the research.19 I gained these participants’ email addresses through contacts 
in Vanuatu as well as NGO and government websites. I generally addressed my 
emails to the head of the department or organisation, but often sent it to a few people 
within the organisation in order to get a response. I hoped to interview anyone 
involved in any aspect of monitoring and evaluation.  
I received a few responses back from emails and confirmed a small number of 
interviews before I arrived in Vanuatu. Once in country, I gained the names of others 
working in monitoring and evaluation in NGO or government departments through 
personal networks and called or emailed to arrange interviews. In some cases in 
Luganville I would visit offices and arrange an interview or even be granted one on 
the spot. I felt comfortable doing so, having lived in Luganville and having been sent 
to each organisation on the advice of others in the sector.   
Many planned interviews fell through or I would turn up at the arranged time and 
find no one there. In most instances when this happened another staff member would 
volunteer to be interviewed or the absent participant would be contacted and another 
interview time would be set up. I did not find this experience overly frustrating as I 
knew the heavy demands placed on participants and granting an interview was done 
out of their own goodwill. Prior to the research I accepted that I would not be able to 
undertake all the interviews I had planned. 
                                                
19 For an example letter see Appendix III. 
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In Port Vila, most of the recruitment was through email. Again, I mainly emailed 
potential participants whose addresses I had gained through personal networks. Most 
of the originally planned interviews fell through in Port Vila and it was difficult to 
get hold of participants via email or phone. As earlier indicated, I knew I could have 
walked into a government department and asked for an interview. But without the 
connections that I had in Luganville I felt very uncomfortable doing this and chose 
to approach government departments in Port Vila more formally. In retrospect, I 
could have approached the departments in person to leave a letter. 
I had intended to interview local people working in NGOs and government 
departments, but after arriving in Vanuatu I was struck by the question of what local 
actually meant. Did it mean the person had to be Ni-Vanuatu? Many people of other 
ethnicities have been in Vanuatu for generations. Furthermore, if people of other 
ethnicities had been appointed to monitoring and evaluation roles by Ni-Vanuatu, 
could they not then represent the local? One of the defining features that came 
through from the interviews was how the person described their organisation. Did 
they use “we” and include themselves as a local, or did they use “they”? However I 
did not conclude on a definite term for local. Most of the participants were Ni-
Vanuatu but I did interview some expatriates working for local organisations. These 
were not consultants and I believed that these participants could offer insights into 
experiences of monitoring and evaluation.   
3.9.3 Interviews 
Eighteen semi-structured interviews were conducted. This format was chosen as it 
allows respondents to talk about what is important to them and lets the conversation 
flow to places where it may not otherwise have gone if more structured questions 
had been used (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2010; Ritchie & Lewis, 2003). A set of 24 
questions20 developed from the findings of the literature review guided the interview. 
However, it quickly became clear that there was not enough time to ask all the 
questions and the area they covered was too broad. The questions asked were 
therefore tailored to themes emerging after the initial interviews and follow-on 
questions expanded on issues that each participant brought up.  
                                                
20 See Appendix IV for a list of the questions. 
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One highly successful interview technique was simply asking “Yu kat eni narafala 
tingting blong yu?” or, “Do you have any other thoughts?” at the conclusion of each 
interview. A lawyer friend had suggested I do this as it was a helpful technique for 
making sure nothing was missed. I found that it was very effective and participants 
would use this question to share comments that hadn’t come up in the interview, 
usually an issue they were quite passionate about. Despite my attempt to make the 
environment of the interviews one where participants felt comfortable to storian, 
sometimes the semi-structured interview format was too structured and participants 
felt too restricted by the set questions. This final question allowed participants to 
express their opinion on anything and frequently, the follow-on storian emerging 
from this question led to the most interesting data in the research. 
Interviews were mostly recorded and this significantly increased the quality of my 
interviewing. When recording, I could make interviews more of a conversation. I 
could be responsive and ask follow up questions more easily as I wasn’t constantly 
writing. In most cases, participants were comfortable with the recorder. Permission 
to use it was indicated on the consent form but I also always asked for verbal 
consent. The recorder was not used when I felt it was inappropriate, when a 
participant did not wish for it to be used, or when I conducted an unplanned 
interview and a recorder would have interrupted and overly formalised the 
conversation.  Interviews were significantly more difficult without the recorder. In 
recording by hand, I had to make quick judgments on what information was 
important. However, when later listening to the recordings I would often discover 
other issues of importance that I hadn’t identified during the interview. 
Unfortunately this additional data may have been lost in the interviews written up by 
hand.  
3.9.4 Analysis 
While transcription was time-consuming, especially for interviews conducted in 
Bislama, it allowed me to become very familiar with the data (Langdridge, 2004).  
Transcribing interviews was considerably easier when done immediately after or 
close to the conclusion of the interview. It was easier to recall topics and the silences 
in the transcripts that had been filled with hand gestures. It meant that I did not lose 
too much of the contextual features (King & Horrocks, 2010). Transcribing was 
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done verbatim, I included side commentary (which explained the conversation) when 
necessary. However, despite this, the transcription cannot ever be complete and 
capture the same feeling of the original conversation (Devault, 1990). I made the 
decision to paraphrase conversations about other areas of work when transcribing the 
recordings, listening first to them several times to make sure nothing was missed. I 
kept the original audio files to listen back to throughout the write-up process. 
The data was coded and interpreted by hand, rather than using software. This 
allowed me to get to know the research better and get closer to it. The coded data 
was then grouped into themes. From these themes, I could start to understand the 
direction of the thesis and what needed to be discussed. The research findings were 
presented over two chapters, a significant portion of which through quotes. The 
quotes ensured the participants’ voices came through and that they were at the 
forefront of the research. Unfortunately, I was unable to use direct quotes from 
participants whose interviews were not recorded. The findings of the study led to 
recommendations. As earlier discussed, these are not concrete solutions. The 
intention of the recommendations is to inform, rather than prescribe.   
3.9.5 Dissemination of Findings 
All participants in the research were interested in a summary of the findings. This 
will be emailed to them in both Bislama and English. Participants will also be able to 
request a full copy of the thesis which will be sent in PDF form via email.  
3.10 Limitations 
While the research produced rich and diverse data it was limited by time and scope. 
Data collection was subject to time and finance constraints meaning interviews 
offered after my departure date could not be undertaken. Additional time would have 
enabled me to build stronger relationships with the participants and perhaps produce 
richer data. The scope of a Master's project also limited the research. This meant that 
there were only resources available to look at a single issue and to a certain extent. 
For example, other service providers, such as the Church in Vanuatu, were beyond 
the research scope. However, I believe the interviews were largely representative of 
the aid recipients involved in monitoring and evaluation. While it is acknowledged 
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that the number of participants restricted the research, the congruence of responses 
indicates that the number was suitable.  
3.11 Conclusion 
This chapter has summarised the choices and challenges faced in researching within 
a cross-cultural context. It has illustrated the careful negotiation of epistemologies, 
worldviews, methodologies and methods necessary to conduct research. It has shown 
the synchronisation of social constructivist, feminist and indigenous epistemologies 
to create an appropriate methodology for the participants, the researcher and the 
research context.  Furthermore, this chapter has stressed the importance of reflexivity 
and positionality, illustrating that the researcher cannot be removed from the 
research.  
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Looking In: Reflecting Internally 
4.1 Introduction 
This first chapter of findings presents the participants’ considerations ‘looking in’, or 
reflecting on their own place within the monitoring and evaluation practice. Firstly, 
the chapter will look at local understandings of monitoring and evaluation. The 
participants’ comments on areas of tension with the practice will then be presented. 
These are divided into two groups. The first group represents general concerns: 
systems, staff, communication and coordination. The second group constitutes 
factors unique to Vanuatu: kastom, language and land. Rather than obstacles to 
overcome, these context-specific features form a critique of monitoring and 
evaluation, arising from its inability to account for the local context and 
subsequently promote ownership.  
4.2 Understanding and Involvement in Monitoring and Evaluation  
M&E bifo I no bin wan subject matter we yumi consider se hemi wan 
important something.21 – Government Employee A   
Monitoring and evaluation is a new practice to Vanuatu. While it is gaining 
importance, the participants recognised that it is still relatively weak and faces many 
challenges in the Vanuatu context. In most cases, with the exception of senior-level 
government employees, monitoring and evaluation was discussed primarily in terms 
of reporting. Reporting, the provision of information at periodic intervals (United 
Nations Development Programme, 2009), was the part of the monitoring and 
evaluation practice in which local NGOs and government employees were 
principally involved. While reporting is an important part of monitoring and 
evaluation, it does not represent the whole process.  
For most participants reporting involved processes such as writing up activities, 
inputting numbers and completing reports to give context to projects and 
programmes, explaining challenges and highlights. Presenting a “most significant 
                                                
21 “Monitoring and Evaluation wasn’t something that we previously considered as important.” 
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story22” was also important for some of the participants. While some of the reporting 
was done in place of monitoring, it was unclear how much monitoring was done 
systematically and regularly and used “to provide current advice for implementation 
and adapt design as needed” (Boardman, 2012). However, monitoring was viewed as 
a practice that needed to be done more frequently. Most participants saw a greater 
need for it despite its limited adoption. One participant noted,  
Lo ples ia hemi wan samting we mifala I reli wik lo hem. Sam I save mekem 
reporting be monitoring blong hem nao hemi. Nobody seems to be 
monitoring.23 –  NGO Employee A  
Another participant referenced the decay of government buildings as an obvious 
example of the need for further emphasis on monitoring. This need was also seen in 
a recent public seminar on infrastructure maintenance in Port Vila, which stressed 
the need for increased maintenance, rather than new infrastructure (Dornan & 
Newton Cain, 2013).                                        
Evaluation was largely described as a donor practice. Often local employees would 
help facilitate evaluation but it was usually externally led. The major exception to 
this is the Monitoring and Evaluation Unit, which plays a larger part in Vanuatu’s 
adoption of monitoring and evaluation. As evaluation was so strongly viewed as a 
donor practice, local feelings around evaluation will be elaborated on in the next 
chapter that explores participants’ reflections ‘looking out’ at donors and donor 
processes.  
Despite the fact that most participants were not involved in all monitoring and 
evaluation processes, the participants did have an understanding or thoughts about 
the overall practice. Not surprisingly, given the participants’ consent to partake in 
the research, all participants showed a genuine interest in monitoring and evaluation 
and how the tool could be better used. The participants recognised and often 
                                                
22 The most significant story, or most significant change (MSC) is a form of participatory monitoring and 
evaluation whereby the stories of significant change are collected and the most significant are chosen throughout 
the project cycle (Davies and Dart). In speaking with participants, it often meant simply reporting a significant 
story from their workplace at reporting time.  
23 “It is something that we are really weak in here. Some know how to report but the monitoring of it. Nobody 
seems to be monitoring.” 
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advocated in the interview for the need to strengthen the practice. While participants 
discussed its importance as a tool for the sustainability of development and long-
term effectiveness of projects, financial reasons such as accounting and transparency 
for funding came across as the main driver for conducting monitoring and 
evaluation. This is confirmed by the Pacific Institute of Public Policy (2009: 18) who 
found that, “Monitoring and evaluation generally does not take place until and unless 
tied with external aid”.  This use of monitoring and evaluation primarily as a tool for 
funding is evident throughout the findings and is further commented on in the 
research’s conclusions.  
The participants faced many challenges and difficulties with monitoring and 
evaluation.  General concerns around systems and processes, capacity, 
communication and coordination will be presented first.  
4.3 Systems and Processes 
The absence of robust systems and processes poses a barrier to good monitoring and 
evaluation practice. Given the novelty of the practice, systems and processes may 
not yet be prioritised or properly implemented. Their absence can be seen, for 
example, in irregular data collection as described in this participant’s words:  
It’s easy enough to do but we haven’t really managed to make it become a 
routine thing which is something I think we need to look into. We need to 
make sure that it’s part of the daily, you know, work that we do continually 
and do that. We really have not got any to the monitoring and evaluation 
system in place that is routine. It’s when we need something we go out and 
look for it which is not very good. Currently it’s the way we do things. – 
NGO Employee B 
The lack of proper systems also meant that information would often be collected in 
different ways by different people, creating duplicate systems: 
I was asking to see some of these documentation from the supervisory visit 
and he’s like “Oh I don’t really have any” or hasn’t really kept any records 
and I ask him what form he’s using and he pulled out 4 or 5 different ones 
and he’s like, “I didn’t like this one so I kind of created my own and it’s sort 
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of like”. I showed him the new one that I thought had been rolled out and 
everyone was using and he’s like “Oh, no I’ve never seen it” – NGO 
Employee H 
A further consequence of poor systems and processes was the considerable stress at 
reporting time. Many participants recounted the panic of scrambling for last-minute 
data. Even recorded information could be inaccessible for simple reasons such as 
being deleted from the computer, or lost in the locked computer account of an absent 
staff member. For these easily avoidable reasons data would sometimes need to be 
collected, or recollected, close to the reporting deadline: 
Yes and you’re ringing people and saying this and that! It shouldn’t happen 
because by the time you’re sitting down to do your report you should have all 
the information and you concentrate on your report. In saying that because 
we have databases that the nurses use, the [other staff] have a database as 
well so when it’s reporting time I just go into the database and collect all the. 
But then there are things missing so I have to chase up on this and that. – 
NGO Employee B 
4.4 Staff Capacity 
Improved staff capacity was raised regularly as a necessity for improving monitoring 
and evaluation in Vanuatu. Discussions of capacity are found throughout the 
development literature, including the literature on monitoring and evaluation (e.g.  
Feinstein, 2009; Holvoet et al., 2012; Holvoet & Renard, 2007; Lundgren & 
Kennedy, 2009; Mackay, 2009). The Pacific Institute of Public Policy (2009) 
identified the lack of well-qualified staff, in particular with regard to monitoring and 
evaluation, as one of the major problems facing Vanuatu’s public service. In this 
Vanuatu is similar to many small island countries.  
While many of the participants had undertaken tertiary education abroad or had 
worked for many years in their roles, they recognised the need for monitoring and 
evaluation to be understood and used at all levels within the organisation or 
department, not just those in senior positions like themselves.24 However in reality, 
                                                
24 Most participants were at some level of management if in a larger NGO or government department.  
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the people collecting data were often not familiar with monitoring and evaluation. 
This is highlighted in the following example:  
Blong statem off ating hemi no bin isi. Because yumi use blong mekem wok I 
ko yumi no stap kaontem ol namba ia. Namba hemi no bisnis blong yumi mi 
wantem luk se wok I ko ahead. Hemi talem from laek yu mekem wan rod, afta 
public works bambae I wantem save se long saed blong M&E I wantem se be 
yu, maintenance man lo public works, hamas distance nao yu kaveramap 
long wan wik blong save maintainen for instance the ring road? Hamas 
kilometers? Maintenace man hemi lusman ia. Even site manager blong hemi 
bambae I se, no mi mi silim nomo I ko. Afta while I stap silim rod I kat wan 
man I stap lo ples ia I mekem narawan lo ples ia, I silim I ko. But gradually 
mifala I stap blong developem oli kasem nao.25 – Government Employee A 
This example also emphasises the common feeling that monitoring and evaluation 
requires is as an extra burden. This view has also been recognised by the 
Government (Prime Minister's Office, 2010a: 5). 
Another participant shared a similar story. When collecting information for reporting 
from other ministries, they found that employees could be offended that questions 
were being asked of them: 
So in terms of capacity, we find in, because you know most of the ministries 
are finding this as a new thing to them. You know sometimes some of them 
were so frustrated that you know, because we were installed in 2012? 
Something will take this as, “Why are you trying to ask us this question? We 
are doing our job!” – Government Employee C  
                                                
25 “In the beginning it wasn’t easy because we were used to doing work and not counting all the numbers. 
Numbers weren’t our business; we wanted to make sure work was being done. They would say “you make a 
road” but then after the public works would want to know for monitoring and evaluation, it would want to say, 
“You, maintenance man of the public works, how much distance have you covered in one week to be able to 
maintain, for instance, the ring road? How many kilometres?” The maintenance man then doesn’t turn up for 
work. Even his site manager would say, “no, I just seal the roads”. There are also men sealing roads here and 
another one here. But gradually we are developing their knowledge in this area. “ 
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Naturally, given the limited understanding of monitoring and evaluation overall by 
employees throughout an organisation or department, the participants saw up-
skilling and training across the board as important, 
For M&E yumi nid blong yu trainem, and yu no trainen olgeta long level 
antap nomo, because information flows hemi stap daon ia. Yu nid blong 
channeling training iko kasem olgeta long daon. Wanem nao ol basic 
training requirements blong yu lo ples ia? Needs blong yu blong mekem? 
After yu ko mekem midel reporting, after antap. Then bambae everything I 
klia.26 – Government Employee A 
Basic training is fundamental and vital for increasing basic competence in 
monitoring and evaluation. This has also been highlighted by the Pacific Institute of 
Public Policy (2009) who found that statistics officers in the Ministry of Health did 
not receive reports from the provinces due to insufficient staff, training and 
incentives to check and enter data into the system. Reports could be delayed or not 
completed due to a lack of basic skills such as using the Microsoft programme 
properly and knowing functions such as changing the layout for printing.  
Specific capacity, in terms of being able to report to a donor’s preferred style was 
also mentioned.  Employees could be good at their jobs but it was increasingly 
important to know how to write reports for donors: 
To me I think we need, especially organisations, we need more skilled people 
on how to write good reports and to better monitoring with capacity building 
trainings so we develop to what the donors expected through the trainings 
that we have, we can do it. As long as you know the steps on how to do it. – 
NGO Employee C 
                                                
26 “For M&E, we need to train and not just train those at the top because information flows and is located at the 
lower levels. You need to channel training so that it goes to everyone further down. What are the basic training 
requirements for you here? What are you needs to do the job? After, you focus on the middle reporting, then on 
top. Then everything will be clear.” 
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Many participants brought up the need for a dedicated monitoring and evaluation 
officer(s) to save time and relieve the workload. Dedicated monitoring and 
evaluation staff would have the necessary skills and also be able to be impartial: 
M&E needs to be something we really need to think about because we do a 
whole lot of things are happening and each individual section does their own 
monitoring but it might be good to look at how that can be consolidated into 
an overall [Name of NGO] M&E framework and then educate a group of 
people who just does that. You know they go out. Because sometimes it’s 
difficult for someone within the programme to be critical or to be objective 
about what is happening and what the challenges are? So it’s good, it would 
be good if that happens, but we’re an NGO, we don’t have the luxury of 
people sitting around with no job, nothing to do. Nobody is lying around. – 
NGO Employee B 
However, one concern raised about up-skilling staff is that once trained they 
wouldn’t stay within the organisation, or even within Vanuatu. One participant 
discussed the brain-drain which sees trained Ni-Vanuatu emigrating and leaving a 
capacity gap in their previous roles:  
And also another thing in the capacities you can’t, you know, in Vanuatu we 
are very limited skills people you know people who actually tend to policy 
analyst or monitoring and evaluation there is very few so. So if you tell 
everybody there for three years and then it moves on and then you lose the 
person.  Actually some of us in PNG because now we have the Melanesian 
trade so now some people are going to work in Fiji so that is one of the 
challenges we face we get people moving on. – Government Employee C 
The preceding examples have illustrated that capacity was a central concern for 
participants. However, they saw it as an area that could be improved through donor-
funded training, especially as the monitoring and evaluation practice itself is donor 
induced. The role of donors in funding training will be elaborated on in the next 
chapter.  
4.5 Communication and Coordination 
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Coordination and communication, or lack thereof, was regularly brought up as 
restricting monitoring and evaluation. It was common that within an organisation or 
department reporting would be passed up to management and thereafter never seen 
again. Lack of feedback meant that it was often unclear what was done with the 
reporting and its place within a wider monitoring and evaluation framework. Even at 
management level, where reporting was given to donors directly, donors often failed 
to provide feedback. A common feeling about reporting is illustrated in this 
participant’s comment: 
I don’t have a clear understanding of how this informations are used and 
people who use it. – Government Employee B 
This same participant emphasised the importance of communicating feedback: 
 Now I’m finding that it’s not just lack of reporting, it’s lack of responding. It 
needs two ways; I mean if this is a new practice it needs the two traffic you 
know? You have to communicate. – Government Employee B 
While poor communication and coordination was raised as an issue by some 
participants, others did not identify it as a concern and subsequently may not see it as 
a major obstacle. Moreover two government department employees illustrated strong 
internal coordination and communication in that that they saw their reporting and 
used it to compare outputs and outcomes across other provinces.  
Discussion around communication extended to include the communication between 
NGOs and government, in particular the absence of information sharing. While this 
is something that has been flagged for improvement, participants did not feel 
significant progress has been made. It seemed that while there is an intention to share 
information, there is no-one able and available to take on the necessary coordination 
role. The Pacific Institute of Public Policy (2009) also noted the limited effectiveness 
to date of this focus on centralising and sharing data. Hence, NGOs and government 
departments produce documentation but the absence of a central collection point 
means that it is not available to be accessed or utilised by other parties: 
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Yeah, there’s a lot of information that is being collected and has been 
collected also in different ways, but there is no central place where you can. 
[Name of person] was supposed to look into setting up a central place where 
all, any research that is conducted in Vanuatu, all the reports go there and 
someone is supposed to collate it and if questions are asked they can direct 
them to this place. Forget it! Too difficult, it’s too difficult! Too big of a job! 
– NGO Employee B 
Government employees also identified the limited communication received from 
NGOs resulting in confusion around the location and work of the numerous NGOs in 
Vanuatu. Participants commented that it is sometimes very unclear which 
organisations are working within a single community: 
One problem that we face here is that we also want to know what the NGOs 
are actually doing, because the government we actually monitoring the 
budget and we want to see, for example, we report to the government, what 
the supply department is actually doing, but we don’t even know what the 
NGOs are doing because some changes are actually installed in the water 
supply and we don’t know! We don’t have the information in that and if 
someone in the same area submit a project to us we won’t even know! We 
just approve it! And even if there’s a water tank install or drill, we don’t even 
have that information. So this is the kind of situation we are facing. – 
Government Employee C 
This somewhat strained relationship between government departments and NGOs 
has been identified in the literature (Pacific Institute of Public Policy, 2009).  The 
Pacific Institute of Public Policy (2009: 11) found that institutional volatility, ill-
defined roles and responsibilities as well as weak coordination between provincial 
and national levels contributes to poor coordination and harmonisation. The 
exception to this trend, where close coordination was mentioned in the interviews, 
was between some government departments, the Statistics Department and the 
Monitoring and Evaluation Unit. Despite the difficulties, participants were overall 
eager to strengthen relationships between government and NGOs. They saw it as 
essential for good development: 
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Wan narafala samting bifo yumi ko, ating I mask at ol jejis in ol tingting mo 
attitude even between NGO and government. NGO and government tufala 
should be complementing in their activities.27 – Government Employee A  
The participant continued, 
Good blong coordinate ol information I kam antap. I gud tumas.28 –  
Government Employee A 
4.6 General and Context-Specific Concerns 
Systems and processes, staff, and communication and coordination were highlighted 
as general challenges to monitoring and evaluation in Vanuatu. These same 
challenges are frequent in the literature and are experienced globally. The 
participants felt strongly about improving these factors.  
The second group of concerns (kastom, language and land) are unique to Vanuatu. 
They were noted as internal aspects that collide with monitoring and evaluation. 
These factors constitute the Ni-Vanuatu context and highlight the inability of 
monitoring and evaluation to address the local setting. They will be introduced in 
this chapter, as they are internal factors, and will inform the critique of monitoring 
and evaluation in the next chapter where the participants reflect on external factors 
by ‘looking out’.   
4.7 Kastom 
As described in the introduction29, in this research the term kastom is used as an 
umbrella term to represent Vanuatu’s customs, cultures and traditions. Given the 
importance of the traditional and indigenous in kastom, it naturally collides with 
newly introduced foreign processes such as monitoring and evaluation. Many 
participants commented on this collision. Monitoring and evaluation is currently 
inflexible in relation to kastom:   
                                                
27 “One other thing before we go, maybe there should be changes in all the thoughts and attitudes even between 
NGOs and government. NGOs and government should both be complementing in their activities.” 
28 “[It’s] good to coordinate all the information so it improves. Really good.”  
29 See section 1.3 Setting and Context: Vanuatu. 
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And I think that’s why we fail, not fail but we lack. The expectations for us to 
do M&E, it’s like out of the blue. The offices are landed with this sheet of 
paper that you have to do. It’s new culture, totally. It’s new practice, Ni-
Vanuatu I mean to local offices they’re like, one is this an extra task for us to 
do? Why are we doing this? Because AusAID wants it? Oh no, I don’t know 
where the informations are? So it’s like we jump from A B C and we landed 
on Z. – Government Employee B 
The integration of new practices with kastom is not straightforward. Vanuatu is a 
very diverse country and kastom is unique to different communities. Participants 
explained how monitoring and evaluation needs to be flexible to work with different 
kastom in different areas:   
O even for M&E from we Vanuatu hemi kat wan diverse culture, yu no save 
apply wan standard o wan size fits all I stap long Torres kasem. Mo aelen tu 
oli difren. Wanem mi tokabaot long Santo, sem message ia we yu komunicate 
long santo yu no tink se bambae I kam gud blong talem yu mas changem 
language blong yu blong sutem man we I andastand we I tekem.30 – 
Government Employee A 
Monitoring and evaluation’s inability to work with kastom represents a significant 
shortcoming of the practice. This will constitute a main critique of donors as 
explored in the next chapter.  
4.8 Language 
Notwithstanding the fact that Vanuatu’s lingua franca is Bislama, most reporting and 
evaluations are conducted in English. While a mastery of English in Vanuatu is 
described by linguist Charpentier (2006) as rare, the participants proved that there 
are many people at senior levels with strong English language skills. However, 
Bislama is the only language with increasing use in Vanuatu (Charpentier, 2006). 
                                                
30 “Or even for monitoring and evaluation, because Vanuatu has a diverse culture, you cannot apply one standard 
or one-size-fits-all from the Torres down. All the islands are different too. What I was talking about in Santo, this 
same message that you communicate in Santo you don’t think that it can be told like that, you need to change the 
language to suit the person you are speaking to so he understands.” 
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The conflict between what is required for reporting and the linguistic reality is 
captured in this participant’s comment: 
We have to get every report in English. Most of the time they’re in Bislama 
though. – NGO Employee E 
It would be difficult for Ni-Vanuatu to play a strong role in the higher-level 
monitoring and evaluation processes without a strong command of English. 
Similarly, Kulwaum (undated) argues that the use of English in bureaucracies in 
Papua New Guinea prevents the participation of those who are not confident in using 
English in its written form. Writing in English could be difficult even for Ni-
Vanuatu staff that speaks English well, especially when, as participants explained, 
donors expect a particular type of language for reporting. To make matters more 
complex, French is also used for administration. One francophone participant 
commented on the frustrations of reporting in French only to have Anglophone 
readers misinterpret the information. 
While Bislama was not used for reporting to donors, in some organisations Bislama 
could be used for reporting at lower levels within the organisation. However, it is 
still challenging for some to convey information, even in Bislama, in written form. 
Ni-Vanuatu come from a strong oral culture where knowledge is traditionally 
communicated orally (Vanuatu Kaljoral Senta, 2013) and storian is very strong. Ni-
Vanuatu have a remarkable oral history and ability to recall. As a result, collecting 
information and recording it in written text is not always current practice: 
People are still, the verbal communication in Vanuatu is still very strong. 
Amazing people remember the things they’ve done the last 12 months very 
well so they verbally communicate it. The keeping records written, it’s 
getting there slowly. – Government Employee B  
Accordingly, one participant found that they had significantly greater success in 
compiling reports through voice recordings, rather than written reports.  
4.9 Land  
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The vast archipelago of rugged terrain that constitutes Vanuatu, together with poor 
road infrastructure, inevitably leads to major issues of accessibility. This land barrier 
has been identified as a challenge to other sectors such as the economy (International 
Labour Organization, 2009) and the court system (Forsyth, 2009). While some good 
roads have been built on Efate and Espiritu Santo, it is difficult to access villages off 
the sealed routes. Many communities are difficult to reach and access on dirt roads is 
extremely difficult following the frequent heavy rains. Consequently, it is very 
expensive to access remote areas. This results in a high cost to conduct routine 
monitoring and providing verification as demonstrated in this participant’s example: 
If I get the report from the Public Works Department and they will tell me 
that in the report they will say ok, in last 6 month, we actually fixed the road 
from this point, this point, this point, this point in South Santo. But how can I 
prove it? And I can’t even go there because there is no money to fund my trip 
there and there’s no money to pay for transport! So it’s very costly also. You 
have to verify this.  – Government Employee C 
One participant spoke of data that needed to come into town from rural villages. 
Information is usually collated in Port Vila and Luganville or occasionally in 
provincial centres. However, without the additional funding for those living rurally, 
the significant distance and difficulty of travel meant that reports did not arrive or 
needed to wait for someone else from the rural area to be travelling to town. 
The remoteness and difficulty of access also poses problems for harmonisation 
amongst government and NGOs. Participants commented that it is often difficult to 
know what projects and programmes are taking place between the plethora of NGOs 
and government working in remote areas. One province is currently running a 
project to try and map the activity of different groups working within the province to 
allow for better coordination. 
A Pacific Institute of Public Policy (2009) report suggests that improvement and 
increased adoption of information communication technologies, such as mobile 
phones, radio, internet and television, can play a large part in lowering the 
disadvantages of inaccessibility. Communication, though substantially improved in 
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the last five years due to a significant increase in mobile phone subscriptions 
(International Telecommunication Union, 2013), is still fragile. 
Other suggestions for improved participation of rural areas in monitoring and 
evaluation include training. This can help alleviate the costs of having staff from 
Port Vila and Luganville travel to rural areas: 
It’s a challenge. So but if we have capacity in the provinces like, you know 
provincial government they have the office but if they have a M&E expertise 
there they could assist us, go there and verify information. –Government 
Employee C 
The significance of land to Ni-Vanuatu means it is not something that can be ignored 
by conducting all monitoring and evaluation in Port Vila and Luganville. To allow 
for people in rural areas to be counted and be able to take part in monitoring and 
evaluation while living in their villages, the issue of land needs to be taken into 
account in the monitoring and evaluation practice.  
4.10 Conclusion 
The internal factors pertaining to monitoring and evaluation expressed in the 
participants’ interviews can be divided into two groups: general and specific to 
Vanuatu. The context specific factors (kastom, language and land) offer a critique of 
monitoring and evaluation’s ability to work within the local context. Kastom, 
language and land not only represent the Ni-Vanuatu context but are anchored in Ni-
Vanuatu identity. Their inclusion is therefore critical in promoting ownership which 
in turn is key to successful monitoring and evaluation systems (Morra-Imas & Rist, 
2009). While the new aid agenda’s focus on results management has been picked up, 
its rhetoric of ownership, through the inclusion of the Ni-Vanuatu context, is yet to 
become a reality.   
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Looking Out: Reflecting Externally 
5.1 Introduction 
“Looking Out: Reflecting Externally” explores the participants’ views on donor 
behaviour and practices associated with monitoring and evaluation. Participants 
discussed and critiqued the reporting formats and the frequency of reporting. They 
furthermore highlighted funding for capacity building, ownership issues in external 
evaluators, and discussed harmonisation and alignment. The preceding chapter’s 
context-specific factors inform the critique of the donor processes in this chapter, 
particularly with regard to monitoring and evaluation’s poor tailoring to the Ni-
Vanuatu context. Suggestions from the participants for the improvement of donor 
systems and practices are woven throughout the discussion and inform the themes 
drawn in the concluding chapter.  
5.2 Reporting Style 
5.2.1 Indicators 
Donors are particular in how they want participants to report. In line with the aid 
agenda’s focus on results management, participants noted donors’ demand for 
quantitative indicators. However, many participants also had the opportunity to 
explain and add context to any numbers they had to submit. Indicators and targets 
reported on would usually link to the original proposal or agreement with donors. 
Deviations from the targets outlined in the proposal needed to be explained. Such 
rigid reporting, however, led to problems of representation where the reality of a 
project or programme could not be expressed through pre-established indicators. 
This same finding was expressed in the literature review (e.g. EURODAD, 2008). 
For example, a project could be highly successful but this success may be difficult to 
capture in quantitative indicators. One participant explains a situation where the 
quality of a project failed to be captured quantitatively: 
So many volunteers’ assignments the outcomes are not really measurable in 
numbers and I feel really bad that there are some volunteers that when they 
get to that graph you just see them deflate saying “Oh, I haven’t done 
anything”. So I have to explain that this is just a way that [name of NGO] 
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needs to be reporting, but it’s all just so, I find there’s just huge areas for 
inaccuracies in that, you know, what is a training programme? I’ll have 
some volunteers who developed perhaps a course in food safety or something 
and they’ve done that for half a day or the equivalent by the time there’s 
breaks etc and yet I’ve got a volunteer who’s on Ambae who’s running a 
training in a joinery course and the number of training completed, he hasn’t 
finished it yet and it’s a six month training course and the students will get a 
certificate at the end of it. And I know we include the number of days that’s 
included but it’s really difficult to actually be accurate in representing what 
quality of trainings and so all a bit waffly. – NGO Employee D 
Indicators are often unrepresentative as they are not tailored to the Ni-Vanuatu 
context. Donors often put forward universal indicators that reflect global aid trends, 
ignoring the local context. For example, one participant commented on a gender 
ratio their NGO was required to submit. However, in seeking to represent the place 
of women in farming groups the gender ratio ignored kastom and the way that Ni-
Vanuatu live and work. It does not necessarily provide the best representation: 
I think sometimes as it becomes a little bit theoretical because if one of your 
monitoring objectives is to identify the gender ratio for example, how would I 
know how many females might be part of a farmer group when in Vanuatu 
ownership of resources and management of resources is very much a male 
thing, it doesn’t necessarily mean to say that the female is not involved but 
how do I monitor that? And therefore how do I then say which members are 
then part of the savings scheme when again it might be the male for the 
household that takes the name on the savings or loan co-op agreement. – 
NGO Employee F 
Similarly, the following government employee explains how an indicator failed to 
recognise that monitoring and recording information is not yet routine throughout 
Vanuatu, so records should not be depended on in all circumstances:  
So, initially, one of the indicators was to see an improvement in the 
immunisation rate vaccination, you know they vaccinate kids. And they want 
to see the number increases. If not all Vanuatu but at least the reports are 
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coming it’s increasing the doctors and nurses are actually going out into the 
provinces. But then there is a problem with the indicator that, you know, this 
has not been increasing, but it’s not the case because some nurses have been 
doing the vaccination but they have not been recording. And then it was, we 
thought, you know, and then we thought that ok, maybe this indicators is not 
good. We cannot see yeah, so we have actually changed that indicator to the 
rate or budget allocated to fund medical supplies. And the rate of medical 
supplies distribution, the distribution to the provinces, if you want to see it 
increasing, if we should have increasing that means that the supplies are 
actually going out to the provinces. – Government Employee C 
However, there is a significant difference between the two previous examples. While 
NGOs tend to accept unrepresentative indicators, the participants working in senior 
government positions are able to influence the indicators. This is demonstrated by 
the change in indicator in the preceding quote and further reinforced by another 
government employee: 
Samtaem ol donors oli kivim wanem ol perceived to be good indicators. But 
then as they come then we lukluk long graon and se ok be indicator I kud be 
samtaem hemi broad tumas. Maybe yumi stap addressem hemia but the 
grounds of the issue stap lo ples ia, then yumi mas review, save revisitem.31 – 
Government Employee A 
5.2.2 Reporting Format 
Although some participants supported the simplicity of a formatted template, it often 
failed to account for complex activities and contexts. This has been noted elsewhere 
in the literature (e.g. Wallace et al., 2006: 118). Consequently, bound by the template 
and operating within an NGO with limited power to dictate the terms of reporting, 
one participant explained the necessity of creativity: 
                                                
31 “Sometimes the donors give what are perceived to be good indicators, but then as they come we look on the 
ground level and say, “Ok, the indicator is good but sometimes it’s too broad. Maybe we are addressing this here 
but the grounds of the issue are over here”. Then we must review and then revisit.” 
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As someone at [name of NGO] said “Throw the logframe out and then you’ll 
be alright”, we sort of say that quietly. We’re running a market project and 
sometimes our market projects don’t fit really well to the logframe so we 
have to be a little bit creative and that’s really the answer I would give in 
that within your objective of your activity within the logframe you have to 
actually be a bit creative about the way you answer the questions. – NGO 
Employee F 
Similarly, attribution proves difficult within the reporting framework. This critique 
was highlighted in the global literature, whereby a web of factors, not necessarily 
just one project, contributes to an outcome (Koeberle, 2005). One participant 
discussed how NGOs feel pressured to claim the sole cause of a change. The 
pressure to claim attribution discourages cooperation on an informal level as NGOs 
need to claim outcomes for their own reporting: 
I get excited about that because I think that’s a really good way to do 
development is that we’re all working together but there can be sort of a 
territorial thing when it comes to reporting as to who can claim it. Whereas 
I’m thinking you know surely you can say it’s a collaborative thing but the 
message I get back is that [name of NGO] has to say, the pressure is on them 
to say what is done. – NGO Employee D 
As discussed in the previous chapter, language, especially donor language, poses a 
challenge to reporting. Donors expect reporting to be carried out in English despite 
many Ni-Vanuatu not feeling confident in the language. Consequently in some cases, 
as seen in the following example, only a few people within the organisation (in this 
example, an expatriate) are able to write reports, 
In cases like this that we would get people like [Name of person] come in 
who are, you know, understands Bislama and English and then we’ll be able 
to put it in the language that is correct for [donors]. – NGO Employee E 
One participant seeks to overcome this obstacle by encouraging staff to report 
through numbers, thus overcoming the writing component of reporting.  
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Overall, the rigid style of reporting, employing universal indicators, fixed templates 
and demanding the use of English is clearly not designed for Ni-Vanuatu. Adding to 
this, the poor level of feedback from donors reaffirms the belief that monitoring and 
evaluation is a tool for donor funding, rather than as a tool from which to learn, to 
share successes and improve development practice in Vanuatu. The following 
participant summarises this feeling:   
It’s just going into the system to tick the box to get the money. So I do 
question that I mean I think some of the real output is not actually utilized 
properly so if you do something that’s exceptional within the project, they 
don’t have a system to cope with that. So do you expect kind of you know they 
talk about cut and paste logframe output, is that really all they want from 
their money? Or do they want something that’s actually going to stand 
outside of the box and give people the opportunity to stand outside of the box. 
– NGO Employee F 
5.3 Frequency of Monitoring and Evaluation 
Many participants critiqued the frequency of monitoring and evaluation. Problems 
around timings of monitoring and evaluation relate back to the original proposal 
made with the donor. The significant lag between submitting a proposal and 
beginning a project means that intentions for monitoring and evaluation can be cast 
into the background:  
Yeah, we have the problems that we get funding for directly and we manage 
that’s sort of ok because the proposals should have originated from us so 
we’re supposed to know what we said we’d check up on, but again you write 
the proposal and sometime the time between when you write the proposal 
and you get the money is sometimes a bit ridiculous. So by the time you’ve 
got the money you’ve got no idea what you said you were going to do and the 
circumstances have changed – NGO Employee B 
When reporting is often used as a vehicle for monitoring, it needs to be more 
frequent so that timely changes can be made to a project. For at least one participant 
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it appears that this is the case and changes to a project need to be signalled through 
reports and then approved by the donor: 
Not only that be taem yu mekem changes after wan year samtaem hemi kam 
too late blong mekem changes. Yu should have made the change maybe six 
months ago, be naoia yu leko I kam kasem one yia I stap kam too late now.32 
– NGO Employee A 
On the other hand, some participants found donors had unrealistically high 
expectations about what could be achieved and reported back within a defined 
period. For example, when results lag participants find it particularly difficult to 
report required outcomes from one phase in order to receive funding for the next: 
They’re like they give their funds in phases, like phase one, phase two, and 
maybe funding the phase one you will see that in phase two there’s some 
results from phase one that has been overlooked or something. Sometime you 
have a report for one year and it’s hard to get the most significant changes 
straight away. – NGO Employee E 
Local NGOs mentioned this same concern in the Wallace et al. (2006) study in 
Uganda and South Africa: it was difficult to report on change within a period that 
was not long enough for change to have occurred. Accordingly, the following 
participant thought the timings of evaluations need to match the expectations of the 
impacts. For example, if a programme aimed to change attitudes, indicators to 
measure this change would not be evident or available immediately. 
And some sections, [government department name] for instance you know, 
often a lot of donors funding has phase 1, has phase 2, 10, 5 years the project 
ends. For me to evaluate [sector of work] when you want to change people’s 
approach to [sector of work] attitude behaviour, that’s silly! You can’t do 
that in five months phase project! You know? So to me in a way we’re not, if 
that’s an expectation, that’s not realistic. Maybe give it, I don’t know, they 
                                                
32 “Not only that but when you make changes after one year, sometimes it comes too late to make changes. You 
should have made the change maybe six months ago, but now you’ve left it one year, it’s too late now.”  
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have to find ways to come back twenty years later. – Government Employee 
B 
The scheduling of evaluations and reviews was also important to the participants, as 
it required a large amount of their time. One participant felt that their NGO was 
targeted for reviews as a result of the good work they were doing and therefore 
donors would continuously review and evaluate their work to demonstrate effective 
aid spending to taxpayers. Consequently, staff at this NGO was disproportionately 
engaged in evaluations and reviews compared to other NGOs: 
If an evaluation happens every two to three years that’s ok. I think that 
shouldn’t be too bad if it’s a manageable thing and it makes sense to do an 
evaluation because it’s the only way you can find out information that you 
can then use to build your programme, but it’s not very productive to do it 
too often and if an evaluation is going to be done for the clinic, that one 
evaluation should be enough for everybody to, you know, get their 
information from. I don’t think it’s fair on the organisation or on the people 
for different groups and different donors to be wanting, you know this one is 
ok but we want this kind of information. It’s very, it can be very painful. – 
NGO Employee B 
The participant continued,  
In the last five years, probably five or more. And so we get reviewed quite a 
lot. I don’t know why but I guess it’s because we do the work and so it’s one 
way for the donors to show their money is being, we’ve done. – NGO 
Employee B 
5.4 Donors to Fund Training 
Training was seen as an important way that donors can support participants in 
overcoming challenges in monitoring and evaluation. Training would allow more 
people locally to be involved in the process, rather than outsiders coming in to 
complete the work, and therefore increase local ownership: 
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That’s why, coming back to your question about donors, how they’re 
providing assistance I think the basic, for now is proper training local staff. I 
mean the stretch of the government is pretty good, I’ve never been in the 
government but if you’re in the government you are a public servant, serve 
here, you staff in the system, that’s good, train that person. The advisors who 
come and go that nothing personal evolves. Train, the more training the 
better. I know M&E is new, as I say, new culture, so don’t jump to you know, 
“Do this, do this”, just provide training first you know? Have people on the 
right track. – Government Employee B 
The participant stressed the need for skills to be passed on to local staff, rather than 
consultants who may carry out the work without sharing any knowledge with others. 
The participant also emphasised the need for basic training, as identified in the 
previous chapter: 
That’s a lot of training I mean AusAID is doing, I’ve attended a couple but 
specifically more on analytic reporting which is fantastic but I can access say 
you’re going too advanced reporting but how do we collect that information 
at the start? – Government Employee B 
Financially, participants saw monitoring and evaluation training as the donor’s 
responsibility: 
Hemia nao olsem33, for donors to fund the project then they have to look at 
whoever but have some money for capacity building the staff.– NGO 
Employee E 
Another participant agreed: 
Yeah, if they’re serious about, if they want it to happen then they should fund 
it. But they say well you haven’t put it in the budget? You gave us a thing and 
we don’t want [we’d rather put our money] into the activities than checking 
up for what you want to know, you should pay for that! – NGO Employee B 
                                                
33 “That’s it, like” 
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Wallace et al. (2006) found that there was limited financial support for monitoring 
and evaluation, yet donors were increasing their demands for monitoring and 
evaluation. The participants in this research understood that monitoring and 
evaluation was important and a necessity, but they needed support to build capacity 
in this area.  
5.5 External Consultants and Reviewers 
Evaluations and reviews constitute a large share of participants’ face-to-face 
interaction with donors. Consequently, a significant proportion of the conversation 
with participants around donors focused on external consultants and reviewers. Most 
participants discussed evaluations and reviews as something that was externally 
driven and conducted.  
However, participants were very clear that the involvement of a local person was 
fundamental for a review or evaluation’s success.  Moreover, many participants 
considered it important to involve someone from the participating organisation or 
department in the running of the evaluation.  One government employee even 
extended the necessary local involvement to a government and CSO employee. One 
participant explained how reviews or evaluations were carried out at their NGO, with 
the involvement of a staff member: 
I think most of the reviews that come to [Name of NGO] have been, you 
know, working with [Name of NGO] and have a background of what [Name 
of NGO] is doing and kind of understand the situation in [location of NGO] 
and [Location of NGO] and then they walk around with some other good 
staff like [Staff member name] or [Staff member name] that helps take the 
information out from the staff that they inform. – NGO Employee E 
It was acknowledged that involving someone from the organisation or department 
could lead to a conflict of interest, but involving staff was seen as necessary given 
their invaluable understanding of the organisation: 
I think it’s better and then it’s better because then they’ll know the situation 
and I dunno whether the information given it’s you know, not conflict of 
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interest and everything but it’s honestly reporting on what’s on the ground. – 
NGO Employee E 
Wallace et al. (2006: 113) describe donors’ concern for objectivity in evaluations as 
leading to external evaluators who “often lack skills and understanding of local 
context”. It was clear that a balance between objectivity and local ownership, 
between donor and recipients’ needs must be found. Some areas of government are 
beginning to demand this ownership by requesting their own inclusion in 
evaluations; they are now being invited by donors to be part of evaluations. When 
their request for inclusion is declined, they assert ownership by going through 
subsequent reports and questioning any inconsistencies: 
It’s getting, I think in the past five years I think government has been 
emphasising has been telling donors that you guys if you want to evaluation 
you have to involve the local counterparts. But in some instances they don’t 
involve us. I know for some projects, some programmes we are not part of, 
they just and then they present the findings to us. Say this is what we find out. 
And then we start asking questions! – Government Employee C 
5.5.1 Kastom 
Respecting kastom is important for effective communication and appropriate 
collection of information, hence, fundamental to a successful evaluation or review. 
Kastom stresses the need for locals to be significantly involved in evaluations, 
ideally leading them. Giving consideration to kastom in evaluation has the potential 
to increase ownership of the process. In turn, increasing ownership has the potential 
for even greater recognition of kastom in the monitoring and evaluation practice. 
Kastom dictates the best methods to use in conducting an evaluation. These methods 
will vary between islands and villages. Sometimes simply involving a Ni-Vanuatu 
will not be enough, rather someone native to the area is needed, a man ples34. The 
role of kastom in dictating the best approaches and ways to communicate with 
communities was frequently pointed to. The participants stressed the importance of 
                                                
34 A local person 
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the review/evaluation team’s ability to understand the kastom of communities and 
the people they would be talking to:   
Taem bifo yu ko yu mas save wanem nao culture blong olgeta, hao nao yu 
approachem ol man. Fasion blong toktok, sam taem yumi toktok strong. Yumi 
toktok strong se “Yu mas mekem!” Yu toktok strong hemia I no save mekem. 
Be sapos culture I se bae yu toktok slo I stap sakem sloslo I ko be hemia I 
stap harem ia, hem bae I mekem today. Be sapos yu luk hem yu toktok strong 
hem I no kat taem.35 – Government Employee A 
Hence, foreigners conducting evaluations and reviews should familiarize themselves 
with the kastom of where they are carrying out their work to try and make the people 
they are interviewing more comfortable. Another participant gives a similar 
example: 
Be ating sapos man we hemi kam blong review I mas save lelebit ol wei 
blong Melanesian people, hemi mas save gud olgeta lelebit before hemi kam 
blong review blong mekem se oli filim fri blong kivin ol gud information. 
Samtaem oli no kivim gud information nomo from maet oli fraed o no lisen o 
samting olsem.36 – NGO Employee G 
However, there is no substitute for a local person. One participant explained that 
communities feel more comfortable when approached for an evaluation by someone 
who not only knows their kastom but also physically looks like them: 
And then mekem se mifala I mekem review, culture blong yumi hemi very 
important so mi mas helpem donor blong save about sensitivity blong culture 
blong yumi. Mekem se taem we mifala I ko long wan community olsem sam 
                                                
35 “Before you go you must know what their culture is, how to approach these people. Style of speaking, 
sometimes we speak strongly. We speak strongly saying “You must do it!” You talk strongly this person will not 
do it. But if the culture says you speak slowly, you deliver [the words] slowly, then this person will hear it and he 
will do it today. But if you look at him and speak strongly, he won’t bother.”  
36 “But maybe if the man who comes to review he must know a little about the way of Melanesian people, he 
must know them well before he comes to make his review so they can feel free to give good information. 
Sometimes they don’t give good information because they might be afraid or not listen or something like that.”  
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taem yu se people bambae save be open sapos oli luk appearance blong yu 
hemi klosap semak blong olgeta.37 – Government Employee A 
5.5.2 Language 
Language is another fundamental reason to involve local people. Language is 
strongly linked to kastom; it is one expression of kastom (Ligo, 1980). Language 
poses problems for external evaluators and communities alike. The participants 
highlighted the importance of carrying out any interviews in Bislama, or the 
language in which people interviewed feel comfortable to express themselves. Often 
people could not express themselves in English:  
The time they come in every review and all this. It’s good, it’s good but they 
get the consultants all in English and sometimes they get someone to, you 
know, all the staff together, tok tok, might there’s a chance later but the staff 
cannot really express themselves. – NGO Employee E 
Communication in the community’s tongue allows evaluators to present themselves 
and suitably explain their reason for conducting interviews. However when 
interviews are conducted in English, communities find it difficult to express 
themselves properly and do not fully understand where the evaluator is from and his 
or her reason for being there. Conducting interviews in English poses a barrier to 
community views being heard. This NGO employee explained how people often feel 
towards the evaluators:  
Some but not all of them. There’s always this. I don’t know, it’s like they all 
shut in their, all you know, mind and everything cannot really explain. 
Unless they understand what’s raised, where the reviewer is coming from. – 
NGO Employee E 
Another participant confirmed this: 
                                                
37 “And then we review, culture is very important so I must help the donor know about the sensitivities of our 
culture. Therefore when we go to a community like sometimes people will be open if they see your appearance is 
quite similar to theirs.”  
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Hemia lo saed lo research olsem o hemia we oli kam review ia ol man blong 
review ia olsem se I gud blo wan we hemi review hemi toktok bislama hemi 
mas traem I understandam language blong ples long hia because samtimes 
sam information we I save gud be oli no save hao blong oli kivim stret 
tingting ia long wan man we I shud be. I mekem se sam taem oli fraed from 
oli no save toktok English, o oli fraed long man we I kam ia. 38 –  NGO 
Employee G 
5.5.3 Ownership 
While an awareness of kastom and language, as well as involving a local person in 
evaluations and reviews is critical, it is also important for the NGO or government 
department to have a say on the person who is conducting the review. The ability to 
veto is an important step towards greater ownership. Government appeared to have a 
greater say on who is included in evaluations as well as the ability to demand the 
inclusion of Ni-Vanuatu. However one NGO participant indicated that saying ‘no’ to 
a donor would be an option. This participant explained: 
I think depending on who is paying for it. Sometimes we have say who gets 
selected for some I think AusAID and NZAID funded reviews, we have the 
same who was selected so, other people who applied, we’d say no. And part 
of it is that we didn’t really know somebody who had no idea, we actually 
had a bad experience with one of the consultants who came, who was 
recruited by a regional organisation and knew nothing about us and came 
and attended one play and wrote this really awful thing that took us a while 
to sift through and back and forth kind of thing, but yeah, we generally have, 
are able to say no. – NGO Employee B 
                                                
38 “That’s with regard to research, like, when they come and review here, all the people who do reviews, like it 
would be good if one who reviews speaks Bislama. He must try to understand the language of this place, because 
sometimes some information which can be good they don’t know how to give their straight thoughts to this man. 
It makes it that sometimes they are afraid because they cannot speak English, or they are afraid of this man who 
comes.” 
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5.5.4 Increases in Ownership of Evaluations and Reviews 
In order to summarise the thoughts and comments of participants with regard to 
evaluations and reviews, a figure has been drawn to illustrate the different degrees of 
ownership that their comments represent. Figure 1 maps the participants’ suggestions 
about external evaluations and reviews and ranks them as to how much ownership 
they promote, their ability to incorporate kastom and their risk to objectivity. 
Different NGOs and government departments sit at different levels of the table, or 
may even sit at multiple levels. As discussed by one of the participants (and brought 
up as a donor concern by Wallace et al. (2006)), external evaluators may bring 
higher objectivity, so increased ownership by local NGOs and government of 
evaluations risks the loss of objectivity.  
While ownership increases for the NGO or government department as they climb 
higher up the table, overall ownership of programmes and projects for recipients may 
not necessarily increase as there is a possibility for corruption to increase. In other 
words, ownership does not increase if only those in senior positions make decisions 
that do not represent others (Buiter, 2007). Movement up the table, however, can be 
seen as increase in ownership when viewing ownership as a relative term 
(EURODAD, 2001: 3) whereby ownership increases with movement away from the 
previous context and the application of processes by outsiders.   
Finally, movement up the table increases the potential for kastom to be included in 
the evaluations or reviews. With greater involvement of Ni-Vanuatu, kastom and 
language can better direct the process. However whether they would be better 
incorporated in practice would fall to the implementers.  
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5.6 Harmonisation 
Harmonisation is central to the Paris Declaration (2005) and represents a major 
donor commitment within the agreement. Nevertheless, the participants found that 
donors were not harmonising and loaded participants with heavy monitoring and 
evaluation burdens. Consequently, the participants undertook a plethora of reporting 
for donors as donors regularly requested different information to be presented in 
unique formats. This situation even occurred when multiple donors were funding the 
same project. Understandably the participants found this difficult. If reported 
information was shared between donors the number of different processes 
undertaken for monitoring and evaluation could be reduced and subsequently relieve 
staff of unnecessary duplication.  
The following government employee explains the current situation with multiple 
funders and multiple requirements: 
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Ni-Vanuatu lead evaluations and reviews 
Ni-Vanuatu included in evaluations and 
reviews (higher ownership if selected by Ni-
Vanuatu) 
Government department or NGO can veto 
reviewer/evaluator selected by donor 
Evaluator/reviewer has extensive knowledge 
of Ni-Vanuatu kastom and Bislama 
Evaluator/reviewer has some knowledge of 
Ni-Vanuatu kastom and Bislama 
Evaluator/reviewer has no knowledge of Ni-
Vanuatu kastom and Bislama 
 
Figure	  1:	  Increases	  in	  ownership	  of	  evaluations	  and	  reviews	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Oli kat difren kaen requirements but sem taem oli mas kam blong luk save se 
wanem nao hemi, wanem mifala, oli mas kam blong consideram that while 
we have multiple fund donors we have different requirements. We must be 
mindful se beneficiary blong yumi hemi kat limited resources. Filling 
different forms, adapting to different modalities, hemi no reli helpem mifala 
tumas. And you wantem usem se this M&E modality yu save then complitem 
lo other activities, other projects, lessons learnt from place ia yumi save 
expandem I ko long sam narafala.39 – Government Employee A 
This same challenge was illustrated by Wallace et al. (2006: 113), where problems 
with multiple donors and multiple requirements could mean “major problems of 
multiple accounting and writing myriad reports”. The difficulty and stress that a lack 
of harmonisation causes is highlighted in this participant’s comment: 
Hemi had. And especially lo mifala lo ples ia we mifala I lukaotem ol major 
infrastructure projects, samtaem bae I had if yumi kat wan M&E officer 
nomo. He mas mekem blong hemia blong mitim, after project ia I nidim se I 
mekem hemia, project ia hemi nidim hemia, and then inside lo project ia I kat 
multiple funders, multiple donors, head blong hemi fasfas bambae I ko 
kranke nao!40 – Government Employee A 
The differences in reporting requirements for different donors were so significant 
that participants could compare the level of difficulty of reporting between donors. 
For example the following participants commented on the different levels of 
reporting requirements for different donors: 
                                                
39 “They have different requirements but sometimes they must come to know that what it is, what we, they must 
come to consider that while we have multiple fund donors we have different requirements, we must be mindful 
that our beneficiary has limited resources. Filling different forms, adapting to different modalities is not really 
too helpful. And you want to use this M&E modality, you can the complete for other activities, other projects, 
lessons learnt from this place we can expand to go to some other ones.”  
40 “It’s hard. And especially for us here who look after all the major infrastructure projects. Sometimes it will be 
hard if we just have one M&E officer. He has to do this for the meeting, and then this project here needs him to 
do this, this project needs him to do this, and then in this project there are multiple funders, multiple donors, his 
head will get confused then he will go crazy!”  
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Oxfam41 has a, some very specific question and their questions for M&E are 
always, you know, they always come back to us and really want us to prove 
that this has been the changes, and these are the changes. – NGO Employee 
E 
Hemi isi lo sense that EU hemi talem wanem stret hemi requirem. Mi wok lo 
wan project bifo blong olgeta blong UN oli fundem, hemi no kam putum 
template so yu jas ko in write anything you want and hemi save kam out wan 
bifala.42 – NGO Employee A 
Globally, DAC donors are performing poorly in their attempt to harmonise (see 
performance in indicator 10a and 10b of the Paris Declaration (OECD, 2011a)). 
However, in Vanuatu donors were closer to their target in joint analytical work 
including evaluations (OECD, 2011c). In practice participants did not see donors 
prioritising harmonisation for reporting requirements: 
Sector olsem M&E yumi tokabaot donor, planti taem yumi tok abaot donor 
coordination but what hemi min? Sam taem I fasfas lelebit because sam taem 
samfala I no wantem to be coordinated too. 43 – Government Employee A  
In response, government departments are using ownership as a tool to harmonise 
donors on monitoring and evaluation. By compelling donors to align with local 
reporting they can stop the duplication of information:  
They also have their different kind of, you know they have the expectations 
from the, different kind of reporting, format they want, but what we’ve been 
doing is that now, we’ve actually convinced them that we will only report to 
every one of you, we are going to produce only one report. So now everyone 
is accepting the report, the only report. – Government Employee C 
                                                
41 Oxfam here was funding a project, this is not the name of the participant’s workplace. 
42 “It’s easy in the sense that the EU says exactly what it requires. I worked on one project before which the UN 
funded, they didn’t give us a template so you just go and write anything you want and it can come out as a very 
big (report).”  
43 “Sectors such as M&E, we talk about donors, often we talk about donor coordination but what does it mean? 
Sometimes it’s a bit confusing because sometimes some don’t want to be coordinated too.”  
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This type of alignment was only evident in government, there was no such evidence 
from NGO participants. The preceding example showed government pushing 
alignment in reporting. Alignment in data collection for evaluations is also 
increasing. Despite the fact that evaluations are still largely conducted by donors, 
donors are beginning to accept government data: 
Yeah, take the information we are actually providing them. And this happens, 
the same thing happens with AusAID now they actually came this morning, 
this afternoon they just came and they wanted to validate the data and the 
sources of information that I gave them last three days. So, basically they’re 
actually using, they’re actually trusting us with this information. – 
Government Employee C 
However the overall level of alignment was limited, confirming what is found in the 
global literature: donors have been slow to align with recipient countries’ monitoring 
and evaluation systems (OECD/DAC as cited in Holvoet et al., 2012).  
5.7 Conclusion 
The significant feedback from participants on donor behaviour and practice was 
overall consistent. The participants found the donor style of reporting difficult and 
inflexible to the local context, particularly kastom and language. This same critique 
applied to evaluators. The burden of the monitoring and evaluation processes, 
together with the lack of harmonisation from donors, undermines ownership. 
However, NGOs and government are slowly finding ways to assert more control 
over processes. This can be seen in small but significant ways such as government’s 
influence on indicators, the NGO that can veto evaluators, the government’s push for 
alignment and furthermore the ability of all the participants to reflect and critique the 
process. 
While NGOs and government differed considerably in the levels of power they 
exercised in their relationships with donors, they each had similar concerns 
regarding donor practice. Namely, it is important that the local context is included, 
local participation increases and donors are receptive and encouraging of this.  
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Conclusions 
6.1 Summary of Findings 
This research sought to understand the place of ownership in monitoring and 
evaluation in Vanuatu. It explored and examined the monitoring and evaluation 
experience of NGO and government department employees involved in the practice. 
Subsequently an understanding of some of the factors affecting ownership of 
monitoring and evaluation has begun to be unravelled and recommendations for 
improving ownership can be made in this chapter.  
The thesis began with a review of the literature that placed the research within a 
neostructural paradigm highly influenced by neoliberalism. Neostructuralism’s push 
for ownership echoed in documents such as the Paris Declaration was explored and 
discussed. Ownership’s increasing popularity, despite its vague definition, was 
highlighted. The literature also looked at neostructuralism’s focus on accountability 
and results management that advocates for the increased application of monitoring 
and evaluation. However, research has shown that at present ownership is not 
strongly reflected in the practice. Looking closer into the geographical context of the 
research within Vanuatu and the Pacific, the literature showed that neoliberalism’s 
presence is still evident through the reform packages accepted by many Pacific 
Island nations including Vanuatu. The neostructural agenda has also been adopted. 
Vanuatu has recognised the move to results management and has established a 
Monitoring and Evaluation Unit. However, the extent to which the neostructural 
focus on ownership is apparent within monitoring and evaluation in Vanuatu leaves 
a gap to which this research can contribute.  
The research was influenced by social constructivism together with indigenous and 
feminist epistemologies. These epistemologies contributed to the use of semi-
structured interviews and the employment of constant reflexivity. In recognising the 
need to incorporate indigenous approaches, the research used a storian approach and 
interviews were conducted in Bislama where appropriate. Ethics remained a constant 
concern and all aspects of the methodology reflected on the need to operate ethically.  
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The field research was conducted in Port Vila and Luganville, the two main urban 
centres of Vanuatu. Eighteen participants were recruited largely through email 
contact from personal connections or through the recommendations of others. 
Although set questions were written for the interviews the conversation often steered 
away from these and the most valuable insights came from asking “yu kat eni 
narafala tingting blong yu?” or “do you have anything else you would like to say?” 
The data from the interviews was personally transcribed, analysed and coded 
allowing a closer relationship and understanding of the participants’ comments.  
The findings were presented over two chapters. The first chapter, “Looking In: 
Reflecting Internally” examined the participants’ concerns and ideas regarding their 
own undertaking of monitoring and evaluation. They discussed general concerns 
centring on systems, staff capacity and communication and context-specific concerns 
addressing the discord between monitoring and evaluation and kastom, language and 
land. The second chapter, “Looking Out: Reflecting Externally” focused on the 
participants’ thoughts about the donor behaviour and systems. These two findings 
chapters will be analysed, leading to the discussion of three themes: relationship, 
flexibility and ownership.  
6.1.1 Looking In: Reflecting Internally 
Monitoring and evaluation is a new practice to Vanuatu. Reporting was the main part 
of the monitoring and evaluation practice in which the participants were involved. 
Monitoring was occasionally discussed as a part of reporting and many participants 
noted that monitoring needed to be improved. Evaluation, on the other hand, was 
seen as a donor process. However, participants were concerned about the entire 
practice and subsequently results presented explore beyond reporting requirements. 
Participants reflected on their own use of monitoring and evaluation and noted two 
main groups of tensions with the practice. Firstly, there were general barriers to 
monitoring and evaluation that are reflected widely in the development literature: 
weak systems and processes, limited staff capacity and poor coordination and 
communications both between and within government and NGOs. Limited staff 
capacity and weak systems and processes arise partly because of the novelty of the 
practice. T
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government and NGOs meant that there was lost opportunity for sharing of data and 
skills, as well as for improving the processes between themselves. This is an area the 
participants had previously flagged as needing work. It is paramount that these 
general barriers are addressed as they are interconnected. Weakness in one area can 
affect another. Similarly, a strengthening of capacity, processes and skills in one area 
can have a flow-on effect in strengthening the whole group of factors.  
Kastom, language and land constitute the second group of tensions identified by the 
participants. The participants noted the disharmony between these factors and 
monitoring and evaluation. Kastom, representing Ni-Vanuatu customs, culture and 
tradition, plays a very important part in the lives and identity of Ni-Vanuatu. It is 
ever present and dictates the Ni-Vanuatu way of life. Participants commented on the 
discord between the new practice of monitoring and evaluation and Ni-Vanuatu 
kastom. They furthermore noted the difficulty of a universal approach to monitoring 
and evaluation in Vanuatu when kastom differs considerably within the country. 
Vanuatu’s unique linguistic situation, as one of the most linguistically diverse 
countries in the world, also poses difficulties for monitoring and evaluation. While 
many Ni-Vanuatu speak multiple languages, English may not be one of them. It can 
be challenging for Ni-Vanuatu to lead or participate in monitoring and evaluation, 
usually conducted in English, when the practice does not allow for their mother 
tongues. Finally, the Ni-Vanuatu geography influences the practice of monitoring 
and evaluation. An archipelago of diverse geography coupled with poor access 
means that processes have to be tailored to the difficulties inherent in the land. Many 
communities are excluded from the practice as they are difficult to reach, living in 
villages accessible via dirt roads difficult to use after the frequent, heavy rains.  
While kastom, language and land are by no means an exhaustive list of Vanuatu’s 
distinguishing features, they were those most discussed when considering 
monitoring and evaluation in Vanuatu. Kastom, language and land have earlier been 
described as fundamental to Ni-Vanuatu identity and therefore essential in defining 
Ni-Vanuatu ownership. It is imperative that these factors are addressed not as 
barriers to overcome but as tools to shape monitoring and evaluation so the practice 
fits the Ni-Vanuatu context. These factors therefore are critical in supporting Ni-
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Vanuatu ownership of the monitoring and evaluation practice and any new process 
that is introduced to Vanuatu.  
When ‘looking in’, the data resulting from interviews with NGOs and government 
departments was congruent. NGO and government participants reported similar 
concerns and thoughts regarding internal factors affecting monitoring and 
evaluation.  
6.1.2 Looking Out: Reflecting Externally 
The findings discussed in the “Looking Out: Reflecting Externally” chapter 
highlighted the challenges participants faced working with donors and using donor 
monitoring and evaluation systems. The necessity for donors and donor practices to 
better adapt to the local context, including respect for Vanuatu’s kastom, language 
and land, underlay most of the concerns that participants raised. Similarly, these 
factors constituted a main critique of Vanuatu’s CRP as illustrated in the literature 
(Gay, 2014). These context-specific concerns were evident in reporting formats, 
indicators, evaluations and donor harmonisation. The participants also pointed out 
that donors have a part to play in providing and funding training to improve capacity 
in Vanuatu.  
The reporting that donors demand is often very rigid and requires a strong command 
of written English. Reporting is largely quantitative, but sometimes indicators 
provided by donors are not very representative of a situation on the ground. Only 
some participants felt they are in a position to contest indicators if they disagree with 
them. Frequency of reporting was also discussed. Participants often find reporting to 
be either too frequent in that it does not allow enough time for change to take place 
and the results reported on, or too infrequent so that challenges that arise cannot be 
reported in a timely enough manner to enable change. The reporting problems 
discussed indicated that monitoring and evaluation was not sufficiently tailored to 
the Ni-Vanuatu context to be used effectively.  
Participants reported they are eager to use monitoring and evaluation as a longer-
term tool for sustainability. However, at present they see it used primarily as a tool to 
meet donor accountability requirements and linked to past or future funding 
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conditions. In essence monitoring and evaluation is approached narrowly in its place 
within the project cycle and is exercised in limited, project-bounded time frames. 
Unfortunately it is not exercised in the way in which participants saw its best value: 
as an overarching, holistic approach to inform development and improve overall 
sustainability.  
Much discussion emerged about how evaluations could be improved. Evaluations are 
currently a donor-driven part of the monitoring and evaluation practice and local 
ownership is very low. Recommendations to improve the process varied, ranging 
from evaluators needing a better understanding of Melanesian culture, to the 
requirement of a local person being part of the evaluation, through to a local person 
leading it. The recommendations emphasised the need for evaluations to be 
conducted in a culturally appropriate manner. The boldness of the recommendations 
from the different participants reflected the varying degrees of ownership they 
exercised. Participants working for NGOs made suggestions indicating lower levels 
of ownership, such as the need for the evaluators to understand Melanesian culture. 
However, larger NGOs demonstrated the ability to make stronger recommendations. 
The government departments’ push for greater involvement and leading of the 
process reflected their overall increased level of ownership and greater power in 
relationships with donors compared to NGOs.  
While donors were close to their target in joint analytical work as measured against 
the Paris Declaration in Vanuatu (OECD, 2011c), in practice it did not appear that 
the principle of harmonisation is being played out in monitoring and evaluation. As a 
result, participants struggle with the heavy burden of fulfilling multiple requirements 
for donors. Some areas of government are using alignment as a tool to combat this. 
By pushing for donors to use their reporting, they force donors to harmonise by 
refusing to bow to multiple reporting requirements. Despite this example of 
alignment, overall alignment also appeared weak (confirmed by its poor performance 
in its Paris Declaration Assessment (OECD, 2011c)), despite this being a 
fundamental step in increasing local ownership.   
Government and NGOs differed considerably in their relationships with donors and 
their ability to influence monitoring and evaluation processes. Government has 
gained stronger ownership and plays a much larger part in monitoring and 
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evaluation. Its increased focus on the practice is seen in the literature through the 
creation of the Monitoring and Evaluation Unit and the Monitoring and Evaluation 
Policy (Prime Minister's Office, 2010a). Government departments also demonstrate 
greater power than NGOs in their relationship with donors. NGOs do not have such 
an influence on processes and are therefore more bound by donor demands. Their 
dependence on reporting to gain funding in the often-volatile funding situations of 
NGOs would undoubtedly be a factor contributing to this. This same behaviour by 
NGOs has been seen in the literature (e.g. Wallace et al., 2006).  Larger, more 
established NGOs appeared to have more of a say, although not yet to the same 
extent as government. Interestingly, this finding illustrates the success of 
neostructuralism in building up the state. It furthermore marks the move away from 
neoliberalism’s focus on NGOs as shown by the lower ownership demonstrated by 
NGO participants.  
Despite the different types of relationships that government and NGOs have with 
donors, the two sectors offered the same overall critique of donors and their 
processes. Similar to the first findings chapter, the second findings chapter showed 
that government and NGOs were principally concerned with donors’ inability to 
tailor their processes to the Ni-Vanuatu context. Government and NGOs advocated 
for increased involvement of local people in order to increase ownership and 
effectiveness of monitoring and evaluation.  
6.1.3 Looking In and Looking Out 
The two findings chapters highlighted concerns with monitoring and evaluation and 
ownership of the practice. These concerns are listed below in Figure 2. They 
illustrate that neostructuralism is struggling with enforcing multiple agendas. While 
results management is being pushed through monitoring and evaluation, the limited 
local participation in the practice, capacity issues, poor tailoring of the practice to the 
local context and the commonly held view that the practice is an extra burden for 
staff (Prime Minister's Office, 2010a: 5) do not illustrate a promotion of ownership. 
Moreover, the findings of this research could indicate that increased monitoring and 
evaluation requirements are creating an ‘inverse sovereignty effect’ (Murray & 
Overton, 2011a) in Vanuatu whereby monitoring and evaluation is undermining 
sovereignty by increasing bureaucratic burdens.  
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Figure	  2:	  Participants'	  concerns	  
The findings presented have uncovered the first part of the aim of the thesis: the 
place of ownership in monitoring and evaluation in Vanuatu. These findings will 
now be further explored in order to investigate the second part of the aim: how 
ownership in monitoring and evaluation can increase.   
6.2 Themes 
The need for kastom, language and land to inform monitoring and evaluation is 
highlighted in the first chapter of findings “Looking In: Reflecting Internally” and 
woven throughout the responses of the participants in the second chapter of findings 
“Looking Out: Reflecting Externally”. The importance of these local factors, 
reflecting the identity of Ni-Vanuatu, highlights the critical importance of the local 
context in increasing ownership. The findings lead to recommendations for a focus 
on relationships and flexibility viewed through a local lens to bring about an increase 
in ownership of monitoring and evaluation. A local lens would ensure a tailored 
approach to monitoring and evaluation, allowing for higher ownership and 
sustainability (Lundgren & Kennedy, 2009). Figure 3 conceptualises the main 
themes of this research to be further explored: relationships, flexibility and 
ownership. The local context, including kastom, language and land, informs the local 
•  Staff capacity 
•  Communication and coordination 
•  Systems and processes 
•  Kastom 
•  Physical barriers 
•  Language 
Internal concerns 
•  Reporting style 
•  Frequency of reporting 
•  Funding of monitoring and evaluation training 
•  External evaluators/reviewers 
•  Harmonisation and alignment 
Concerns regarding donors 
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lens through which these themes will be considered. The two themes of relationships 
and flexibility contribute to the increase of the third theme: ownership.  
 
Figure	  3:	  The	  role	  of	  local	  context	  and	  local	  lens	  in	  influencing	  themes	  of	  
relationships,	  flexibility	  and	  ownership	  	  
Figure 4 further conceptualises the themes of this research. It shows how the themes 
are used to increase ownership of monitoring and evaluation. It identifies the local 
lens as the fundamental first step that is continuous and through which all stages of 
the process are viewed. As seen in Figure 3, the local lens reflects the local context.  
Following this, an emphasis on relationships and flexibility enables donors to be 
better aware of ownership issues, for balances of power to be examined and for 
NGOs and government to more effectively advocate their needs. Finally, once local 
approaches have begun to be developed and NGOs and government are able to claim 
their needs and direct processes with donors, capacity issues can be addressed. 
Capacity building is the final step as the capacity needs of Ni-Vanuatu need to be 
reassessed under a Ni-Vanuatu monitoring and evaluation framework. Training 
based around donor systems that disregard the local context could simply result in 
Ownership 
Relationships 
Local Lens 
Local Context (Kastom, Language and Land) 
Flexibility 
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the promotion of donor-mirrored practices and systems. It would mean training in 
those same processes that have been critiqued in this thesis. Moreover, it would 
cause Ni-Vanuatu to change their behaviour for external systems, rather than the 
systems changing to fit Ni-Vanuatu.  
 
Figure	  4:	  Increasing	  ownership	  of	  monitoring	  and	  evaluation	  
Unfortunately, aid practices and relationships are messy. The reality would not be as 
straightforward as Figure 4. Naturally, changes will not follow this exact path as the 
ideas involved are complicated and government and NGOs may be at different 
points on the figure. However, the figure does highlight the issues important to 
enabling ownership and how they might work together to improve ownership of aid 
practices such as monitoring and evaluation. The recommendations from Figure 4 
are intended as a guide, based on the findings of the research. They need to be 
interpreted and moulded to the different contexts in which they apply. The 
underlying principles of the figure can be used to influence practice, using different 
elements to different degrees. The chapter will proceed with further discussion on 
the employment of this figure by examining the use of relationships and flexibility 
for ownership. 
Local Lens 
A Local Lens approach 
is adopted. Issues are 
approached through a 
local lens steered by 
local context factors 
such as kastom, language 
and land. 
Relationships and Flexibility 
Relationships are built 
and strengthened 
through a relationship 
focus and employing 
flexibility. Power 
relations are examined. 
Capacity 
Capacity issues are 
examined and addressed, 
determined by the Ni-
Vanuatu framework.	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6.2.1 Relationships 
The need for relationships in addressing ownership was highlighted in the literature 
review. In order for ownership to develop partnerships need to evolve and power 
imbalances need to be addressed: 
The form ownership takes and the problems of achieving it change over time. 
Whatever the form, ownership dynamics imply the renegotiation of 
partnerships to make them less unequal in bargaining power, more tolerant 
of differences in views, and based upon the recipient government and 
national stakeholders driving the development process  (Cramer et al., 2006: 
422). 
For monitoring and evaluation to be better tailored to Vanuatu and for ownership to 
increase, changes need to be demanded by government and NGOs and equally 
encouraged by donors. For such demands to be made and for donors to understand 
how best to encourage changes, sound and respectful relationships need to be 
established. Such relationships would encourage NGOs and government to start 
asserting their views on monitoring and evaluation practices. Furthermore, through 
dialogue, relationships would allow NGOs and government to gain a better 
understanding of the needs of donors.  
The importance of relationships was evident in this research. The advantages of 
stronger relationships with donors were seen in the different approaches to indicators 
and evaluations by government and NGOs. Government felt comfortable enough to 
refuse indicators and express their desire to be better represented in evaluations. 
NGOs were more limited in what they felt comfortable to convey to donors.  
This need for an overall stronger focus on relationships has been seen elsewhere in 
the literature. An NGO participant in the Wallace et al. (2006) study into the aid 
chain commented, “…there needs to be a middle path between donors’ interests and 
the NGOs’ interests… Building relationships and not just systems is key” (2006: 
116).  Mancuso Brehm (2001) also stresses the need for this shift of focus to 
relationships, rather than projects. Eyben (2004, 2010) believes donors should focus 
more money on relationships.  She found that while many aid practitioners are 
already focusing on relationships, it is in the guise of results management or other 
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paradigms and so the importance of relationships is therefore not emphasised 
(Eyben, 2010). 
The focus on relationships over projects challenges the idea that monitoring and 
evaluation is primarily a funding instrument. Presently a significant proportion of 
donors’ communication with participants is through donor visits for evaluation and 
reporting, resulting in a relationship centring on funding. However, as one 
participant pointed out when commenting on the relationships between government 
and NGOs, a relationship should be built on the common interest of Vanuatu’s 
development: 
Whether you want to help improve the life blong man Vanuatu44, whether you 
want to help improve advancement of Vanuatu or olsem ia.45 - Government 
Employee A 
Regardless of the differences between donors, NGOs and government, they (ideally) 
share this same objective even if it is not their sole ambition, and individual 
accountabilities, incentives, interests and approaches often cloud this objective.  
In practice, building any relationship is difficult. However, strengthening the 
relationship between donors and NGOs or government, including negotiating 
intricate power relations, would not need to replicate a formal Western relationship, 
requiring an MoU and meetings at confirmed intervals of the year. Rather, the 
relationship should use the local lens and take the lead from the local context. 
Kastom has its own approaches to building and maintaining relationships 
incorporating different practices such as the sharing of food, the use of storian and 
the drinking of kava. It is logical that a relationship aiming to increase Ni-Vanuatu 
ownership is built through kastom approaches.  
The storian approach, as employed in this research, emphasises relationship building 
(Warrick, 2009) through swapping stories and experiences with others. In my own 
experience of working in Vanuatu, I built relationships through getting to know my 
colleagues. I probably made a fool of myself in my use of Bislama, but it was 
                                                
44“ the life of Ni-Vanuatu” 
45 “or [something] like this” 
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through asking questions and relating personal experiences that strong ties were 
formed. In the preface to this thesis I talked about an evaluator who focused on 
relationships, on bonding with participants before asking his interview questions.  He 
used storian techniques and was guided by kastom through the Ni-Vanuatu woman 
who accompanied and worked with him. It was furthermore seen in the data 
collection that often the richest material emerged from using interviewing techniques 
learnt from Ni-Vanuatu, employing a storian approach and remembering to be 
relaxed and build relationships with participants by sharing who I was and my 
connection with Vanuatu. 
There are many opportunities for storian and shared experience between donors and 
participants in monitoring and evaluation. The act of teasing out processes together, 
for example, discussing language use or best practice in a certain community, could 
also be seen as a way of building a relationship. It is through this process, through 
communication that relationships start to be built. It is not one isolated event, or one 
signature by one person on a piece of paper. Discussions may not always go well or 
have the required outcome, but it is the process itself, taking part in the conversation, 
which can improve the relationship. Once relationships are more respectful and 
robust, communication can become even more effective and allow for honest 
monitoring and evaluation to occur, permitting better reflective data to emerge which 
in turn increases the effectiveness of monitoring and evaluation.   
The processes and opportunities for working more closely will vary according to 
NGO or government department and depend on their current relationship with 
donors. A relationship will be slow to build and may be difficult for donors to justify 
if investment in relationship building doesn’t produce immediate, quantifiable 
results. However, building the relationship slowly and allowing for both parties to 
feel comfortable with each other will benefit the work they are undertaking together 
in the longer term. Taking the processes slowly will require flexibility from donors 
who are bound to deadlines and accountability requirements. Finding a way to allow 
for flexibility within the constraints of accountability will be one of the main 
challenges for donors.  
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6.2.2 Flexibility 
The research highlighted the need for flexibility from donors. Processes need 
flexibility so that local approaches can be found. Donors need to be open to coaxing 
out difficulties in processes with NGOs and government so monitoring and 
evaluation can be used as a tool beyond donor reporting. For example, language 
barriers may be discussed and ideas might be trialled such as reporting in Bislama or 
the use of oral reporting, or another alternative completely may be suggested. 
Flexibility is imperative for the trialling of different approaches that are shaped by 
the context and better understood and adopted by all.  
Flexibility requires donors to be willing to accept poor results, or a process being 
trialled and not succeeding at all. Failures must be viewed as learning. With the right 
channels of communication and strong relationships, lessons learnt can be built on to 
improve practice. The inflexibility of donor reporting often does not allow for 
mistakes to be made but there needs to be a channel for failure to be recognised and 
discussed if projects are to improve. It has been seen in the literature that increased 
donor demands have had a negative effect on accountability and transparency in 
reporting (Burger & Owens, 2010). Increased flexibility to allow for conversations to 
be had about failure, together with better relationships, can be used to promote 
increased accountability and transparency. 
It may, however, be difficult for donors to display flexibility when they are 
accountable to constituencies. It would furthermore be challenging for donors to 
exercise greater flexibility while also trying to increase harmonisation. Participants 
have already highlighted donors’ poor harmonising in monitoring and evaluation. 
Relationships here have an important role to play. The different parties involved 
need to be aware of each other’s responsibilities, and donors especially need to be 
clear where they can and cannot be flexible. Donors, NGOs and government need to 
understand the restraints each face in order to better understand each other’s bounds 
of flexibility. 
Flexibility is furthermore fundamental for relationships to be strengthened. 
Communication through strict templates, isolated visits and limited email contact 
will not promote the sharing of experiences and in turn, the strengthening of a 
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relationship. Donors need to be flexible in how they relate to participants, allowing 
for communication to occur in different ways. Flexibility, in terms of data collection, 
can lead to the gathering of wider and deeper information. As a result, programmes 
and projects can be better informed by the reality on the ground. 
For the most part, building relationships and being flexible is challenging. 
Relationships are difficult to measure and flexibility poses problems around issues 
such as harmonisation, deadlines and accountabilities. Building relationships takes 
time, but participants (and probably also donors) were already pressed for time to 
undertake the current monitoring and evaluation requirements. However, a 
relationship would not only benefit monitoring and evaluation. It would spread its 
benefits over into other aspects of donors, government and NGOs’ work.  
6.2.3 Ownership 
This chapter has argued for the use of relationships and flexibility approached 
through a local lens in order to increase ownership. Many participants are already 
living out behaviour as described in this chapter. But a committed focus on these 
recommendations, especially from donors, could see a greater benefit to ownership 
and monitoring and evaluation.  
Reflecting back to the literature review it was discussed that ownership is difficult to 
measure. However, a good working definition of ownership saw it as “a relative one. 
It really only makes sense when seen in the context of what happened before, and 
thus ownership can be seen as moving away from the imposition of the content and 
process…46 by outsiders” (EURODAD 2001:3). This research cannot comment on 
ownership as a relative term in Vanuatu given the novelty of monitoring and 
evaluation and the limited data available (e.g. OECD (2011c); Pacific Institute of 
Public Policy (2009)). However, future research could look at measuring ownership 
by looking at the change in a number of factors with regard to monitoring and 
evaluation. For example, it could reassess the issues government and NGOs have 
with monitoring and evaluation and how their relationship with donors has changed. 
Questions could be asked, such as whether participants can say ‘no’ to donors. Can 
                                                
46 “of structural adjustment programmes” removed so that the definition could be applied to other situations. 
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they influence processes or even lead processes? Are participants involved in a 
greater part of the practice, rather than solely reporting?  
Moreover, changes in the use of the local context (kastom, language and land) could 
be examined to determine relative ownership. Language use is an easily identified 
and strong indicator of ownership. Therefore the extent of ownership can be 
analysed by looking at the degree of language use. For example, is Bislama being 
used? Are local languages being used? Can Bislama or local languages be used for 
reporting to donors or just internally? The presence of kastom could be seen in the 
methods used for data collection or evaluation. Are local techniques employed over 
popular Western participatory methods? Finally, land could be examined by asking 
whether Vanuatu’s geography is taken into account as part of the practice. Are rural 
communities consistently participating in monitoring and evaluation? Have systems 
been set up to enable data from isolated areas to be included? The research argues 
that a focus on the recommendations of this thesis, the use of relationships, 
flexibility and the local lens would move toward more favourable answers to these 
questions, in other words, to increased ownership.  
6.3 Concluding Comments 
The current delivery of monitoring and evaluation as an aid practice does not 
promote Ni-Vanuatu ownership. The processes within the practice are discordant 
with the Ni-Vanuatu context, notably kastom, language and land. There is no single 
solution to improving a donor practice such as monitoring and evaluation so that Ni-
Vanuatu exercise greater ownership. The factors at play are dynamic and confusing. 
The relationships between donors, NGOs and government are affected by 
miscommunication, imbalances of power, accountabilities and cultural differences. 
However, approaching monitoring and evaluation through a local lens, focusing on 
relationships and adopting flexibility can lead to a new framework better fit for the 
Ni-Vanuatu context. Capacity issues can be addressed following the establishment of 
this framework. This thesis demonstrates the need for monitoring and evaluation to 
be tailored by the local context. Monitoring and evaluation needs to be viewed 
through a local lens if ownership is to be increased.  
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Appendix I: Consent to Participation in Research Form 
 
 
 
Project topic: Monitoring and Evaluation in Vanuatu 
Researcher: Mattie Geary Nichol 
 
You have been asked to participate in research looking at how monitoring and evaluation obligations 
that donors attach to aid impact upon Ni-Vanuatu development ownership. This research will form 
part of a thesis as part of the Master of Development Studies in the School of Geography, 
Environment and Earth Sciences, at Victoria University of Wellington. Please read the information 
sheet attached and ask any questions before deciding to take part in the research.  
 
Personal Declaration: 
I have been given an explanation and have understood this research project. I have had the 
opportunity to ask questions and have them answered to my satisfaction. I understand that I may 
withdraw myself (or any information I have provided) from this project (before data collection and 
analysis is completed by 10th June 2013 without having to give any reason. 
 
If I agree to be recorded, the recording will be held for a period of up to one year, after which it will 
be destroyed or electronically wiped unless I ask that it be returned to me. I understand that full 
interview transcripts will be kept confidential to the researcher and supervisor. I understand that I will 
have the opportunity to check the transcripts and any attributed quotes used before publication.  
 
Please tick the appropriate boxes: 
 
 I agree to take part in this research 
 
 I give permission for the interview to be recorded 
 
 I give permission for my opinions to be recognised by the organisation I work for                 (e.g. 
“Government employee A, B or C” or “NGO employee A, B or C”) 
 
 I would like to receive a summary of the results of this research when it is completed.  
 
 
Name of Participant:                                      
 
 
Signature of Participant:                                                  Date: 
 
Email address of Participant (for return of transcripts or results as requested): 
 
 
If you have any questions or require further information, please contact me 
(mattie.gearynichol@vuw.ac.nz or +64 276 326198) or my supervisor, Professor John Overton 
(School of School of Geography, Environment and Earth Sciences, Victoria University, PO Box 600, 
Wellington, email john.overton@vuw.ac.nz) 
 
Thank you for your time. Tank yu tumas blong tekem pat blong risej ia. Sapos yu kat eni kwestion o 
mi save mekem eni samting I moa klia, plis no hesitate blong askem I kam long mi 
105 
 
Appendix II: Participant Information Sheet 
 
 
 
Project topic: Monitoring and Evaluation in Vanuatu 
Researcher: Mattie Geary Nichol 
 
Tank yu tumas blong tekem intres long risej ia. I am a Master of Development Studies student in the 
Department of Development Studies, School of Geography, Environment and Earth Sciences, at 
Victoria University of Wellington. As part of the fulfilment of this degree, I am undertaking a 
research thesis. The thesis will examine how monitoring and evaluation obligations that donors attach 
to aid impact upon Ni-Vanuatu development ownership. 
 
I am inviting non-governmental organization employees and government department employees to 
participate in this study. All participants will be interviewed through semi-structured interviews 
which should take about 20-30 minutes. Participants will have the opportunity to discuss the 
monitoring and/or evaluation that they carry out as part of their role and their opinions relating to the 
monitoring and evaluation process. Interviews will be conducted in either Bislama or English, 
depending on the preference of the participant. Interviews in Bislama will be translated into English 
for the thesis. 
 
Your participation in the research is entirely voluntary. The responses collected will form the basis of 
my research project and will be put into a written report. I would like to record the interviews so that I 
can use the recordings to write my report. However, the interview will not be recorded without your 
permission. If you would like to withdraw from the project, you may do so at any time prior to the 
10th June 2013 when data collection and analysis is due to be completed. You can either let me know 
at the time or email or phone me if you would like any related material to be destroyed. 
 
The interviews will form part of the final written thesis. You may choose to remain anonymous in 
your opinions and can do so by indicating in your consent form.  The thesis will be submitted to the 
School of Earth Sciences for marking and deposited in the University Library. The collected, collated, 
and analysed data may be published in case studies, academic journals, and/or presented at 
conferences. 
 
All material collected will be kept confidential, only my supervisor, Professor John Overton, and I 
will see this material. The material will be stored securely and destroyed after one year.  
 
This project has ethics approval from the Victoria University Human Ethics Committee. 
 
If you have any questions or require further information on the project, please contact me at 
mattie.gearynichol@vuw.ac.nz or +64 276 326198 or my supervisor, Professor John Overton, at the 
School of Geography, Environment and Earth Sciences, Victoria University, PO Box 600, 
Wellington, or john.overton@vuw.ac.nz 
 
Tank yu tumas blong tekem taem blong ridim infomeisin ia. Sapos yu kat eni kwestion o mi save 
mekem eni samting I moa klia, plis no hesitate blong askem I kam long mi. 
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Appendix III: Sample Letter (Government Department) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Martha (Mattie) Geary Nichol 
            Victoria University of Wellington 
mattiegn@gmail.com 
mattie.gearynichol@vuw.ac.nz 
[Phone number] 
Government Department Address 
24th of January 2013 
Dear Participant 
 
My name is Mattie Geary Nichol; I am representing the Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand.  
 
I am currently enrolled in a Master of Development Studies at Victoria University of Wellington. I am 
focussing my research on the monitoring and evaluation Ni-Vanuatu government and non-governmental 
organisations need to carry out, and are involved in, for donors and the effect on Ni-Vanuatu ownership 
of development.  I was hoping to be able to interview [number] employees from your government 
department in Port Vila and Luganville who are involved with monitoring and/or evaluation. 
 
The research would be through semi-structured interviews conducted in either English or Bislama (I 
learnt Bislama through volunteering in Vanuatu with VSA (Volunteer Service Abroad) in 2011. 
Questions asked would be approved by the Victoria University Ethics Committee and would be emailed 
to your department in advance to give you the opportunity to review them. Government employees being 
interviewed would only answer questions they feel comfortable with. Furthermore, government 
department employees as well as the government department can remain anonymous if requested.  
 
The aims of the research are as follows: 
 
• To identify issues surrounding monitoring and evaluation for the benefit of government 
departments and non-governmental organisations 
• To provide an opportunity for donors to gain a deeper understanding of the challenges 
monitoring and evaluation obligations place on government departments and non-governmental 
organisations 
• To provide an opportunity for donors to gain an understanding of the impact of monitoring and 
evaluation on development ownership 
• To contribute to Vanuatu and Pacific aid literature 
 
At the conclusion of the research your department would receive a copy of the research.  
 
I plan to conduct the research in Port Vila and Luganville throughout April and early May, 2013. The 
research will be funded by the New Zealand Aid Programme Field Research Award.  
 
If your department is interested in taking part in the research, please contact me via my email address and 
I will be able to send you further information. The research has some flexibility and I would be happy to 
discuss ways to make the research as beneficial as possible for your department's use. 
 
Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions. 
 
I look forward to hearing from you. 
 
Kind regards, 
 
Mattie Geary Nichol 
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Appendix IV: Participant Questions 
• What is your role? 
• How long have you been working in this role? 
• Have you worked anywhere else before? What were your other roles? 
• Where did you go to school? 
• Have you done any travel overseas? 
 
• What monitoring and evaluation are you expected to conduct in your role?  
• How is this carried out and how often? (e.g. report writing? If so, in what 
language?) 
• Is monitoring and evaluation sometimes difficult to carry out? 
• Do you have the time, resources, systems and support? 
• Does anyone else in the organisation help you with monitoring and 
evaluation? 
• Do you need any extra help with monitoring and evaluation? 
 
• How can you tell if your job/programme is going successfully? 
• How often do donors come in to assess progress? 
• How do they carry this out? 
• Do you think they ask the right questions to assess your work? 
• What other questions could they ask? 
• Can you give an example of a time when an evaluator have come in and done 
evaluation well? 
• Can you give an example of a time when an evaluator has come in and not 
done evaluation well? 
 
• How can you tell if your job/programme is going well? 
• What kind of results do you think donors want to see? 
• Do you keep in mind what kind of results donors want when designing 
programmes? 
• How does this impact on the design? 
• How do you think monitoring and evaluation could be better or easier for 
you?	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
